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I. INTRODUCTION
When the State of Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Minnesota (collectively "Minnesota") filed their complaint
against the tobacco industry' in August, 1994, the industry had
been profiting enormously for decades from a product that exacted
a huge toll on public health, yet the industry had enjoyed a virtually
1. The defendants were Philip Morris Incorporated ("Philip Morris"), R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company ("RJR"), Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
("Brown & Williamson"), B.A.T. Industries P.L.C. ("B.A.T. Industries"), Lorillard
Tobacco Company ("Lorillard"), The American Tobacco Company ("American"),
Liggett Group, Inc. ("Liggett"), the Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR"), and
the Tobacco Institute ("TI").
[Vol. 25
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perfect record in the courtroom.2 Nearly four years later, on May
8, 1998, when the industry agreed to a settlement-unprecedented
in terms of monetary relief, injunctive requirements, and disclosure
of internal tobacco company documents-Minnesota had achieved
what former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop characterized
as "one of the most significant public health achievements of the
second half of the 20th century.
The key to the industry's defense strategy-which had been
successful for decades-was the concealment of the industry's in-
ternal documents, including documents disclosing the industry's
secret acknowledgment of the health hazards and addictiveness of
smoking, documents disclosing the industry's manipulation of
nicotine, and documents disclosing the industry's dependence
upon new generations of American youth to preserve the viability
of the cigarette market. From the outset of the case, Minnesota
knew that the only way to hold the cigarette industry accountable
was to single-mindedly pursue documents which had not been pro-
duced in four decades of litigation against the industry. The ensu-
ing discovery battles-which resulted in the production of ap-
proximately thirty-five million pages of internal industry
documents-lasted several years and continued well into trial,
when the United States Supreme Court refused the industry's re-
quest to stay an order requiring the production of tens of thou-
sands of documents which the industry had withheld on claims of
4
privilege. A month later, on the eve of the case being submitted to
the jury, the case settled.5
2. As top public health officials have pointed out, the industry's substantial
profits are due, in part, to its ability to shift the "tobacco-related health, social, and
environmental costs onto the public's shoulders." C. Everett Koop et al., Reinvent-
ingAmerican Tobacco Policy, 279JAMA 550, 550 (1998).
3. Henry Weinstein, Big Tobacco Settles Minnesota Lawsuit for $6.6 Billion, LA.
TIMEs, May 9, 1998, at Al.
4. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey, 118 S. Ct. 1384
(1998) (mem.).
5. See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation For Entry of Consent Judg-
ment, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL
394331 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement]; Con-
sentJudgment, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998
WL 394336 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998). Under the settlement, the State of
Minnesota will receive an estimated $6.1 billion over a 25-year period. See Settle-
ment Agreement, Philip Morris, 1998 WL 394331, at *4, *6. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Minnesota will receive $469 million over a five-year period. See id. In
addition, the cigarette industry is bound by unprecedented injunctive restrictions,
including injunctions against making material misrepresentations and against tar-
1999]
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II. DECADES OF CONCEALMENT: THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S
SUCCESSFUL BATrLES BEFORE 1994
There are many reasons why the tobacco industry has been so
difficult to defeat in so many forums-legal and legislative-for so
many decades. One principal reason has been the tobacco indus-
try's ability to keep hidden millions of pages of internal documents
which contain damning admissions.
A. The Industry's "General Patton" Strategy of Litigation
The surgeon general has called cigarette smoking "the most
important public health issue of our time."6 Cigarettes kill when
used as intended, and there is no known level of safe consump-
tion.7 One-fourth or more of all regular cigarette smokers die of
smoking-related diseases." The number of deaths caused by smok-
ing surpasses the combined totals for alcohol, suicide, homicide,
AIDS, cocaine, heroine, and motor vehicles.9
Notwithstanding these deadly statistics, the tobacco industry
maintained an unparalleled record in the courtroom from the
1950s into the 1990s.1 The industry's strategy was based upon
scorched-earth tactics. As one tobacco industry lawyer candidly
geting children in the advertising, promotion, or marketing of cigarettes. See Con-
sent Judgment, Philip Morris, 1998 WL 394336, at *2. The cigarette industry also
must remove advertising billboards in Minnesota, fund smoking cessation pro-
grams, and dissolve one of its trade groups. See Settlement Agreement, Philip Mor-
ris, 1998 WL 394331, at *10. See also Consent Judgment, Philip Morris, 1998 WL
394336, at *2, *4.
6. SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER xi (1982).
7. See SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 490
(1989).
8. See id. at v.
9. See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HEALTH, SECTION FOR NONSMOKING AND HEALTH,
THE MINNESOTA TOBACCO-USE PREVENTION INITIATIVE, A REPORT TO THE 1991
LEGISLATURE, 22-23 (Jan., 1989-Dec., 1990).
10. See Christine Hatfield, The Privilege Doctrines-Are They Just Another Discovery
Tool Utilized by the Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging Information ?, 16 PACE L. REV.
525, 558 (1996). "The tobacco industry has enjoyed a record of success in civil
litigation unique to almost any industry, never paying one cent in settlements or
awards for any injuries claimed by cigarette smokers in their civil lawsuits." Id.
11. See id. at 558-59. "The industry's strategy was simple: 'Never retreat on
any position and attack whenever possible .... .'" Id. (citing Mark Curriden, The
Heat Is On, 80 A.B.A. J. 58, 59 (1994). "The key to this strategy was to remain on
the offensive at all times by denying every claim on the health hazards of smoking
and concealing all damaging research results from the public." Id. at 559; see also
[Vol. 25
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[T] he aggressive posture we have taken regarding deposi-
tions and discovery in general continues to make these
cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs'
lawyers, particularly sole practitioners. To paraphrase
General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by
spending all of [RJR] 's money, but by making all of his.
12
Part of the industry's "General Patton"-style litigation has been
a concerted national strategy of discovery abuse:
[T]he tobacco industry has developed several evasion
strategies of choice, including, but not limited to, delay,
inundating an opponent with reams of useless informa-
tion, use of the court system to wage a war of motions and
protective orders against an adverse party, as well as filing
patently false and misleading responses to discovery re-
quests. Every strategy is designed to force the massive ex-
penditure of frequently scarce plaintiffs resources in or-
der to sort out the data provided or fight for the
enforcement of discovery orders.1
3
The industry's lawyers ensured that it would be prohibitively
expensive for plaintiffs' counsel to represent injured smokers:
They have done this by resisting all discovery aimed at
them, thus requiring a court hearing and order before
plaintiffs can obtain even the most rudimentary discovery.
They have done it by getting confidentiality orders at-
tached to the discovery materials they finally produce,
thus preventing plaintiffs' counsel from sharing the fruits
of discovery and forcing each plaintiff to reinvent the
wheel. They have done it by taking exceedingly lengthy
oral depositions of plaintiffs and by gathering, through
written deposition, every scrap of paper ever generated
about a plaintiff, from cradle to grave. And they have
done it by taking endless depositions of plaintiffs, expert
id. at 530-34 (summarizing the industry's discovery abuse tactics).
12. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J. 1993) (quot-
ing Apr. 29, 1988, Memorandum from J. Michael Jordan, counsel for RJR).
13. Hatfield, supra note 10, at 527.
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witnesses, and by naming multiple experts of their own for
each specialty, such as pathology, thereby putting plain-
tiffs' counsel in the dilemma of taking numerous expen-
sive depositions or else not knowing what the witness in-
tends to testify to at trial. And they have done it by taking
dozens and dozens of oral depositions, all across the
country of trivial fact witnesses, particularly in the final
days before trial.
1 4
Until recently, this litigation strategy of delay and obfuscation
paid enormous dividends for the tobacco industry.
B. The History of Tobacco Litigation
1. The First Wave of Tobacco Litigation
The history of tobacco litigation is usually summarized in three
waves.' 5 The first wave, consisting of personal injury suits by indi-
vidual smokers, surfaced in the 1950s in the wake of the publication
of several scientific studies, which sounded grave warnings on the
health hazards of smoking.16 "The tobacco companies prevailed in
these early cases because plaintiffs were unable to prove a causative,,17
link between smoking and cancer .... In this first wave of litiga-
tion, the industry "hotly contested the causal linkage between• .18
smoking and lung cancer." Indeed, to this day, the tobacco com-
panies deny that it is scientifically proven that smoking causes any
disease. A central theme in these early cases was "foreseeability"-
that is, whether the tobacco industry could foresee the potential
health risks of smoking and whether the industry had sufficient in-
formation about the risks to research those risks and warn consum-
19
ers.
14. William E. Townsley & Dale K. Hanks, The Trial Court's Responsibility to
Make Cigarette Disease Litigation Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 277
(1989).
15. See Hatfield, supra note 10, at 561-88.
16. See E.L. Wynder & E.A. Graham, Experimental Production of Carcinoma with
Cigarette Tar, 13 CANCER REs. 855 (1953); R. Doll & A.B. Hill, A Study of Aetiology of
Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRrr. MED.J. 1271 (1952).
17. Hatfield, supra note 10, at 561.
18. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 853, 858 (1992).
19. See id. at 859-61. This, of course, was before the surgeon general's land-
mark report in 1964, which concluded that smoking caused lung cancer in men,
and before the surgeon general's warnings were placed on cigarette packages in
[Vol. 25
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In one first-wave tobacco case that went to trial, Lartigue v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.,20 the tobacco companies "made a convincing
case for the lack of any causal connection" between smoking and
Mr. Lartigue's cancer.' In fact, although the jury did not state the
basis for its verdict for the industry, the trial judge wrote:
I regret now I did not propound the interrogatory with re-
spect to the connection between the smoking and his lung
cancer because I'm satisfied the jury never got beyond
that question and I know-I'm sure at least that they simply
decided the plaintiff had failed to prove the causal connection be-
tween his smokin2 and his lung cancer but that is water under
the bridge now.
The court of appeals affirmed the jury's finding, noting that
the jury was properly instructed that a risk had to be "reasonably
23foreseeable" before a manufacturer could be held liable. The
court concluded: "Today, the manufacturer is not an insurer• ,,24
against the unknowable.
Yet at the time of the Lartigue trial in 1960, the industry had in
its files documents that surely would have changed the verdict had
they been disclosed. For example, as early as 1953, an RJR scientist,
Dr. Claude Teague, in a document entitled "Survey of Cancer Re-
search with Emphasis upon Possible Carcinogens from Tobacco,"
examined literature with an emphasis on studies actually or poten-
25tially related to carcinogens from tobacco. Dr. Teague concluded:
The increased incidence of cancer of the lung in man
which has occurred during the last half century is proba-
bly due to new or increased contact with carcinogenic
stimuli. The closely parallel increase in cigarette smoking
1966. See SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SMOKING
AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE 1333 (Comm. print 1964).
20. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
21. Id. at 23.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 40.
25. See RJR 501932947-68. All industry documents discovered in the course of
State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc. and cited in this article will be referenced
by Bates number in order to facilitate their location in the two document deposi-
tories and Internet sites.
1999]
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has led to the suspicion that tobacco smoking is an impor-
tant etiologic factor in the induction of primary cancer of
the lung. Studies of clinical data tend to confirm the relation-
ship between heavy and prolonged tobacco smoking and incidence
26
of cancer of the lung.
By 1958, most U.S. tobacco companies secretly believed that
smoking caused lung cancer. In April and May of 1958, three Brit-
ish scientists (including at least one from British-American To-
bacco, D.G. Felton) visited top officials and scientists in the U.S.
27tobacco industry. One object of the visit was to find out "the ex-
tent in which it is accepted that cigarette smoke 'causes' lung can-
cer."28 The British scientists reported widespread acceptance of
causation:
With one exception (H.S.N. Greene) [not formally affili-
ated with any tobacco company], the individuals whom we
met believed that smoking causes lung cancer if by "causa-
tion" we mean any chain of events which leads finally to
lung cancer and which involves smoking as an indispensa-
ble link. In the U.S.A. only Berkson, apparently, is now
prepared to doubt the statistical evidence and his reason-
29
ing is nowhere thought to be sound.
The authors concluded that there was no serious dispute that
the statistical associations constituted a "cause and effect" phe-
nomenon: "Although there remains some doubt as to the propor-
tion of the total lung cancer mortality which can be fairly attributed
to smoking, scientific opinion in the U.S.A. does not now seriously
doubt that the statistical correlation is real and reflects a cause and
effect relationship.
3 0
Industry lawyers recognized that the industry's own docu-
ments, if plaintiffs ever obtained access to them, would change the
result in the courtroom. In 1970, David R. Hardy, of the law firm
of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, longtime outside counsel to the indus-
26. See RJR 501932963 (emphasis added).
27. See BAT 105408491. The BAT scientists met with, among others, repre-
sentatives from American, Liggett & Meyers, Philip Morris, and the Tobacco In-
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try, outlined his fears to general counsel at Brown & Williamson:
Fundamental to my concern is the advantage which would
accrue to a plaintiff able to offer damaging statements or
admissions by persons employed by or whose work was
done in whole or in part on behalf of the [tobacco] com-
pany defending the action. A plaintiff would be greatly
benefited by evidence which tended to establish actual
knowledge on the part of the defendant that smoking is
generally dangerous to health, that certain ingredients are
dangerous and should be removed, or that smoking
causes a particular disease. This would not only be evi-
dence that would substantially prove a case against the de-
fendant company for compensatory damages, but could
be considered as evidence of willfulness or recklessness
sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. The
psychological effect on judge and jury would undoubtedly
be devastating to the defendant.
2. The Second Wave of Tobacco Litigation
The second wave of cigarette litigation, also composed of indi-
vidual personal injury suits, began in the 1980s. In the wake of
the 1964 and subsequent surgeon general's reports and the feder-
ally-mandated warning label on cigarettes, the tobacco industry be-
gan arguing that the hazards of smoking were "common knowl-
edge" and, therefore, smokers who continued to smoke were
merely exercising their "freedom of choice. Thus the tobacco
companies, not without a certain audacity, seamlessly shifted their
battle cry from the first wave of litigation-"smoking doesn't cause
cancer"-to their battle cry in the second wave of litigation-"eve-
rybody knows" that smoking causes cancer.34
31. Peter Hanauer et al., Lawyer Control of Internal Scientific Research to Protect
Against Products Liability Lawsuits, 274 JAMA 234, 235 (1995) (quoting a confiden-
tial letter to DeBaun Bryant).
32. See Rabin, supra note 18, at 854.
33. See id. at 870.
34. Yet while arguing that it was "common knowledge" and "everybody
knows" smoking causes disease, the tobacco companies themselves continued to
maintain that it was not proven that cigarettes cause disease. Even in 1998, Geof-
frey C. Bible, chief executive officer of Philip Morris, testified in the Minnesota
trial, as follows:
Q. Did you go to your fellow CEOs and say, "Let us join together and
1999]
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This "freedom of choice" argument is eviscerated by, among
other things, the fact that smokers are addicted to nicotine. As
with medical causation, the tobacco companies have long been
aware of (and accepted) addiction, but have hidden their internal
documents evidencing this awareness for decades. For example, in
1963, Brown & Williamson's vice president and general counsel
recognized nicotine's true pharmacological reality: "Moreover, nico-
tine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addic-
tive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms. 3 5 Likewise,
in 1980, a Tobacco Institute employee-in a document disclosed
for the first time in Minnesota-wrote: "Shook, Hardy reminds us,
I'm told, that the entire matter of addiction is the most potent
weapon a prosecuting attorney can have in a lung cancer/cigarette
case. We can't defend continued smoking as free choice if the per-
son was 'addicted'." 5
These documents, however, remained secreted in the files of
the tobacco companies throughout the second wave of litigation.
Nevertheless, the second wave of litigation differed from the first in
that it yielded the first significant discovery successes against the
industry. The first meaningful disclosure of tobacco industry
37
documents occurred in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., the most no-
table second wave case: "For the first time, a pretrial ruling com-
pelled the tobacco industry to release thousands of pages of confi-
dential internal documents sought by the plaintiffs to prove that a
conspiracy existed among the tobacco companies to prevent the re-
lease of damaging information on the health hazards of cigarette
get a blue ribbon panel of scientists to tell us does smoking cause dis-
ease?" Did you do that?
A. No, I did not do that, because I really felt that everybody in the
world believes smoking causes disease.
Q. You don't; do you, sir?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know how many have died as a result of smoking?
A. How many people have died?
Q. Died.
A. I don't know if anybody has died. Ijust don't know, no.
Transcript of Proceedings at 5734-46, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2, 1998).
35. B&W 689033415 (emphasis added).
36. TIMN 0107823.
37. 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988).
[Vol. 25
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smoking. " 38 These documents offered the first glimpse of the
treasures that would be found in the industry's files.
Cipollone and its companion case, Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,9
provided the first indications of the extent of the role of tobacco
company lawyers in shielding documents from discovery on im-
proper claims of privilege. 4° In Haines, U.S. District Judge H. Lee
Sarokin wrote that the tobacco industry, "may be the king of con-
cealment and disinformation."41 Judge Sarokin found a prima facie
showing of crime-fraud against the industry, rejecting the industry's42
claims of privilege on its documents. The industry, however, ap-
pealed, and Judge Sarokin's decision was vacated and remanded,
for violations of the Federal Magistrate's Act.45 In addition, the
court of appeals granted the industry's request to remove Judge Sa-
rokin from the case.44
Thus, the tobacco companies continued to stonewall. Many-
in fact, most-of the critical documents remained hidden in to-
bacco companies' files. In 1993, after ten years of litigation, the
plaintiffs' law firm in Cipollone (and related cases filed in New Jer-
sey) requested to withdraw from tobacco litigation, citing the Gen-
eral Patton tactics of the industry and the financial drain on the
firm.45
3. The Third Wave of Tobacco Litigation
The third wave of tobacco litigation began in 1994. In this
wave, the fundamental nature of the claims against the tobacco in-
dustry changed. No longer was the litigation limited to individual
claims by individual smokers. For the first time, states sued the to-
bacco industry seeking wide-scale injunctive relief and to recover
the costs to the states for medical care for injured smokers. In
1994, the States of Mississippi and Minnesota were the first to file
38. Hatfield, supra note 10, at 565.
39. 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992). See generally, Hatfield, supra note 10, at 566-
72 (discussing Haines opinions in greater detail).
40. The plaintiffs in Cipollone and Haines were represented by the same group
of law firms. See Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1489; Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 683.
41. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 683.
42. See id. at 684.
43. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91-94 (3d Cir. 1992), vacat-
ing 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding the district court's characterization of
the Federal Magistrate's Act erroneous).
44. See id. at 98.
45. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 418 (D.N.J. 1993).
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complaints against the industry. In addition to states, other third-
party payors of medical costs sued the tobacco industry. In 1994,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota was the first private payor
of health care costs to sue the industry. The Minnesota litigation
was venued in Ramsey County District Court before then-Chief
Judge Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick. Large class action suits on behalf of
smokers also were filed against the industry in this wave of litiga-
tion.4
The third wave of litigation was ignited by new revelations in
1994 about the tobacco industry's conduct. These included hear-
ings chaired by U.S. Representative Henry Waxman and disclosures
from Dr. David Kessler, then head of the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration ("FDA"). In 1994, the "Merrell Williams documents"
also were disclosed. Merrell Williams was a paralegal working for a
law firm representing Brown & Williamson. Mr. Williams went
public with about 4,000 pages of internal company documents
from Brown & Williamson and its British corporate affiliates, the
BAT Group,47 detailing "a sophisticated legal and public relations
,,48strategy to avoid liability for the diseases induced by tobacco use.
The Journal of the American Medical Association ("JAMA") devoted an
issue to the analyses of these documents, and stated:
We think that these documents and the analyses merit the
careful attention of our readership because they provide
massive, detailed, and damning evidence of the tactics of
the tobacco industry. They show us how this industry has
managed to spread confusion by suppressing, manipulat-
ing, and distorting the scientific record. They also make
clear how the tobacco industry has been able to avoid pay-
ing a penny in damages and how it has managed to re-
main hugely profitable from the sale of a substance long
known by scientists and physicians to be lethal.49
46. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1044 (E.D. La. June 1,
1994).
47. The term BAT Group refers to the British entities that, over time, have
been either affiliates or the corporate parent of Brown & Williamson. These enti-
ties include B.A.T. Industries and/or British-American Tobacco Company Limited
(collectively referred to herein as "BAT").
48. Stanton A. Glantz et al., Looking Through a Keyhole at the Tobacco Industry,
274JAMA 219, 219 (1995); see generally Hatfield, supra note 10, at 575-85 (arguing
that the tobacco industry lawyers abuse the attorney-client privilege as a means of
evading disclosure during discovery).
49. James S. Todd et al., The Brown and Williamson Documents: Where Do We Go
[Vol. 25
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The Merrell Williams documents also contained disclosures on
the role of industry counsel in fostering research that perpetuated
a "controversy" as to whether smoking caused disease and in sup-
pressing research that established the causal link. 0
III. MINNESOTA'S DOCUMENT-INTENSIVE STRATEGY
With this historical backdrop, Minnesota set out on a deter-
mined discovery quest. Many observers believed that virtually no
new discovery was needed, given the prior productions in New Jer-
sey and the new disclosures in 1994.5 ' The tobacco industry first of-
fered to comply with its discovery obligations by producing in Min-
nesota only those documents they had previously disclosed in
litigation elsewhere. Minnesota's refusal to accept this offer-con-
trary to conventional wisdom-proved correct.
Whereas Brown & Williamson, for example, had produced
only 1,350 pages of documents before 1994, it would eventually
produce more than four million pages in Minnesota. Philip Morris
had produced only about 140,000 pages of documents in prior liti-
gation, but in Minnesota would produce more than six million
pages. And while the BAT Group in England had produced no
documents prior to Minnesota filing suit, they too would turn over
several millions of pages of documents to Minnesota. In sum, prior
to the Minnesota litigation, the tobacco companies had produced
only several million pages of documents, virtually all after 1981.
Minnesota would eventually compel the production of approxi-
mately thirty-five million pages of documents from all defendants.
These documents are now in two document depositories, one in
Minneapolis (for the domestic defendants) and the other in Guild-
ford, England (for the BAT Group defendants) 52
Minnesota would have to engage in an unprecedented effort
to obtain these documents. From the beginning, the industry
From Here?, 274JAMA 256, 256 (1995).
50. See Hanauer et al., supra note 31, at 236-37; Lisa Bero et al., Lawyer Control
of the Tobacco Industry's External Research Program, 274 JAMA 241, 244-45 (1995).
51. In 1992, one commentator stated that "[w]hile it is possible that a new
wave of lawsuits would unearth egregious evidence of a cover-up, it seems un-
likely." Rabin, supra note 18, at 875.
52. See generally State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565,
slip op. at 2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 1995). The depositories will remain open
pursuant to the terms of the settlement. See ConsentJudgment, Philip Morris, 1998
WL 394336, at *3.
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fought disclosure at every turn. Minnesota was forced to bring
countless motions to compel. Industry lawyers played endless word
games, claiming they did not know what documents were at issue.
The lawyers claimed, for example, that they did not know what the
following terms meant in Minnesota's document requests: (1)
"smoking and health"; (2) "the properties and effects... of nico-
tine"; (3) "addictive"; (4) "target levels of nicotine in cigarettes";
(5) "minimum dose levels of nicotine"; (6) "safer cigarettes"; (7)
"advertising, marketing or promotion of cigarettes"; (8) "the effects
of cigarette advertising"; (9) "the effectiveness of warning labels";
(10) "sociology or psychology of smokers"; (11) "antitrust issues in
the tobacco industry"; and (12) "document destruction policies."
Another example of the word games comes from this classic
response by Brown & Williamson to plaintiffs' request for docu-
ments:
Brown & Williamson objects to plaintiffs' definition of the
term "smoking and health" on the grounds that it is overly
broad, unduly burdensome, vague and ambiguous, and is
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence. For example, it purports to include all
effects which are "potentially or possibly related to smok-
ing" and "potential or possible effects of nicotine." The
definition is further objectionable on the grounds that it
is overly broad as it includes any alleged "property or ef-
fect" of nicotine, regardless of whether related to health. 3
Several examples of the documents wars-prior to the ultimate
battle over privilege-follow.
A. The Industry's Existing Document Indices
A key, early battle in the Minnesota discovery focused on
document indices that the tobacco industry lawyers had created to
manage the millions of documents relating to smoking and health.
As Minnesota learned, the industry's lawyers began to index all
smoking and health documents in the wake of the Cipollone litiga-
tion in the 1980s. If Minnesota could obtain these indices, they
53. Responses and Objections of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents at 3-4, State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 3,1995).
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would provide vital information regarding the massive universe of
tobacco industry documents. As President Clinton later remarked,
the indices were "the industry's road map to its own documents
and could improve significantly the ability of public health experts,
scientists, state and federal officials, and the public to search
through industry documents."54 The litigation over these indices
lasted for sixteen months, through eight orders of the trial court,
and unsuccessful appeals by the industry to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court.
The trial court first addressed the issue of indices in its first
case management order, in which the court stated: "Each party
shall produce an index of documents along with the production of
its documents, to the extent that each party has an existing index of
documents.- 5 At first, the tobacco industry claimed that it had no
indices responsive to this order. In a subsequent order, the trial
court ordered each side to produce any "previously prepared or
produced" index of documents relative to the subject matter of this
action, "provided, however, that if the producing party claims an
existing index contains subjective information protected by the at-
torney-client or work product privileges, it shall submit such index
to the court for in camera inspection and determination.
56
The industry lawyers claimed that any such indices were
shielded from discovery as attorney work product because the indi-
ces were prepared by outside counsel beginninq in the mid-1980s
during the second wave of tobacco litigation. Attorney work
product-"documents and tangible things.., prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation"5 -is subject to different degrees of protection
54. President's Memorandum to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(July 17, 1998).
55. Case Management Order, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565, slip op. at 9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 29, 1995).
56. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 6
(Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 1995). These indices are generally referred to as the "4A
indices" due to the enumeration of the paragraphs in the order. The industry also
compiled and produced a different index-known as the "41 indices"-that list
the millions of documents produced to the document depositories in Minneapolis
and England. These indices are located at the Minneapolis document depository
and available to the public in searchable format.
57. See Transcript of Hearing at 45-46, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris
Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 12, 1995). RJR claimed that it had
spent $90 million in compiling the indices to respond to "litigation demands." Id.
at 45.
58. MINN. R. Crv. P. 26.02(c).
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depending on its nature. Opinion work product-the "opinions,
conclusions, legal theories, or mental impressions of counsel"-is
generally not discoverable. 59 In contrast, the ordinary work prod-
uct of attorneys, often referred to as "fact work product," is discov-
erable where the party seeking it shows substantial need and undue
burden.°
An attorney's selection of large numbers of documents for in-
clusion on an index does not constitute opinion work product.6' In
such a situation, the documents are "sufficiently voluminous to
minimize disclosure of the attorney's identification of some occa-
sional wheat among the chaff."62 As one court noted in similar con-
text:
Because of the astronomical number of documents in-
volved in this case, it is highly unlikely that [the defen-
dant's] mental impressions would be exposed by produc-
tion of such an index or database. The sheer amount of
documents involved is what led the 3plaintiff to seek the
index and database in the first place.
The heightened protection accorded opinion work product is
not triggered "unless disclosure creates a real, nonspeculative dan-
ger of revealing the lawyer's thoughts."6
59. Dennie v. Metropolitan Med. Ctr., 387 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 1986).
60. Materials prepared by a party's attorney in anticipation of litigation or for
trial are discoverable where the party seeking discovery has "substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means." MINN. R. CIv. P. 26.02(c); see also Dennie, 387 N.W.2d at 406.
61. See Washington Bancorp. v. Said, 145 F.R.D. 274, 278 (D.D.C. 1992) (re-
quiring that document indices compiled by counsel be produced because "[t] he
extreme number of documents indexed here virtually eliminates the possibility
that defendants could glean from this index.., litigation strategy."); see also In re
Shell Oil Refinery, 125 F.R.D. 132, 134 (E.D. La. 1989) (ordering lists of docu-
ments selected by plaintiffs for copying discoverable because "it is highly unlikely
that Shell will be able to discern the [plaintiffs'] 'theory of the case'.., simply by
knowing which 65,000 documents out of 660,000 documents have been selected
for copying."); Scovish v. Upjohn Co., No. 526520, 1995 WL 731755, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1995) ("[M]ere identification of a document or files selected by [the
defendant] (i.e. by tide, date sent, author, recipient, etc.), to be included in the
index or database constitutes ordinary work product.").
62. United States v. Doe, 959 F.2d 1158, 1167 (2d Cir. 1992).
63. Scovish, 1995 WL 731755, at *3.
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After reviewing samples of the indices in camera, the trial
court found that certain portions of the indices were discoverable,
notwithstanding the fact that they were prepared in anticipation of
litigation.65 The trial court carefully segregated those portions of
the indices containing "opinion work product," from the indices'
"objective information."66 The trial court ordered produced only
the most basic, identifying information: for example, document
numbers, document dates, document authors, document recipi-
ents, verbatim tiles, and document types.6 ' The court found that
"parties can produce indices of objective information on the mil-
lions of documents on their databases without revealing attorney
opinion, mental impressions, strategies, or theories." 
6
The trial court concluded that plaintiffs had demonstrated
"substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without un-
due hardship."69 At that time, it was estimated that the tobacco in-
dustry might produce nine million pages of documents. As the
court recognized:
If five attorneys were to devote twelve hours each per day,
five days per week, to the task of reviewing those nine mil-
lion pages-and limit their review to one minute per
page-it would take nine years to review those documents
alone. Creation of a new and separate database identify-
ing the nine million documents would be duplicative,
time-consuming, and costly.
70
71When finally produced, the indices proved invaluable to
65. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at
12 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 1995).
66. See id.
67. See id. (listing fields ordered produced). All subjective information was
ordered redacted, even "inferred" titles and authors and certain information re-
garding the "subject matter" of a document. See id.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id. The fact that the industry eventually produced some 35 million page
of documents only served to underscore the correctness of the court's determina-
tion.
71. The district court stayed production of the 4A indices until defendants
exhausted their appellate remedies. Defendants sought a writ of prohibition from
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The court of appeals denied the writ. See State ex
rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. CX-95-2536 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26,
1995) (citing Mampel v. Eastern Heights State Bank, 254 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn.
1977)). The defendants then sought discretionary review in the Minnesota Su-
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plaintiffs in analyzing documents and targeting further discovery,
including discovery of documents withheld on claims of privilege.
Moreover, given that the plaintiffs now had knowledge of the uni-
verse of industry documents, the tobacco industry was forced to
forego its past strategy of evading meaningful document discovery.
B. Corporate Shell Games
In addition to fighting a war of attrition, the industry also em-
ployed a strategy of international concealment, conducting re-
search offshore-often at affiliated corporations. There also was
evidence of shipping documents overseas, or destroying them.
1. Philip Morris International
Philip Morris took advantage of the formalities of its intricate
corporate structure to claim that it had no obligation to produce
certain documents in the possession of non-party corporate affili-
ates, particularly those located abroad. Some of the most critical
smoking and health research conducted by Philip Morris has been
conducted through its foreign corporate subsidiaries and affiliates,
including entities known as Institute fuer Biologische Forschung
("INBIFO"), Contract Research Center ("CRC"), and Fabrique de
Tabac Reunis ("FTR").
Cologne, Germany, where INBIFO is located, was once de-
scribed by a senior Philip Morris officer as "a locale where we might
do some of the things which we are reluctant to do in this coun-
try."72  One of the reasons given for having INBIFO was
"[clontrol... experiments can be terminated at will as required
without delay.",
7 -
preme Court. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied review without comment. See
State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. CX-95-2536 (Minn. Feb. 27, 1996).
The industry finally produced the indices after the United States Supreme Court
denied their petition for writ of certiorari. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Min-
nesota, 517 U.S. 1222 (1996).
72. PM 2022244451.
73. Id. Internally, Philip Morris treated INBIFO and CRC as an integral part
of its research and development activities. For example, in a document describing
INBIFO's importance to Philip Morris, Philip Morris states that "INBIFO/CRC is
PM's center of excellence for biological research ... INBIFO/CRC perform com-
prehensive biological testing as an integral part of PM's research and development
network." PM 2050975128. Another document further states that "INBIFO/CRC
is embedded in PM's R&D organization," with a chart demonstrating that R&D at
Richmond, Virginia is responsible for 80% of INBIFO's budget and 100% of
[Vol. 25
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Other documents demonstrate the use of Philip Morris Inter-
national subsidiaries for the routing and storage of sensitive docu-
ments. For example, a handwritten document from the files of
Thomas S. Osdene, the former director of Philip Morris research,
states, among other things:
1. Ship all documents to Cologne...
2. Keep in Cologne.
3. Okay to phone & telex (these will be destroyed).
5. We will monitor in person every two to three months.
6. If important letters or documents have to be sent, please
send to home - I will act on them and destroy. 4
Osdene pled the Fifth Amendment when asked about this
document in his deposition.75 As late as 1993, Philip Morris still
appeared to be using INBIFO as an offshore repository for docu-
76ments.
Another document, authored by Robert Seligman, Philip Mor-
ris vice president for research and development, stated that Philip
Morris has "gone to great pains to eliminate any written contact
with INBIFO... [t]he written analytical data will still have to be
routed through FTR if we are to avoid direct contact with INBIFO
and Philip Morris U.S.A."
7 7
Well into discovery, plaintiffs learned that Philip Morris was
not producing all relevant documents from its foreign affiliates.
Under well-established law, however, a corporation cannot refuse
to produce documents simply because they are in the possession of
78
an affiliate. Depending upon the facts of the case, documents in
the possession, custody or control of a corporate affiliate may be
CRC's budget, with R&D Neuchatel responsible for the remaining 20% of
INBIFO's budget. PM 2050975136.
74. PM 1000130803 (emphasis in original).
75. See Transcript of Deposition of Thomas Osdene, vol. 2 at 140-143, State ex
rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.June 17, 1997).
76. See PM 2043725390. "[F]inal reports on PM USA product research are
sent to Richmond for review and are then returned to INBIFO. Supporting data
and documents are kept at INBIFO." Id.
77. PM 2000512794.
78. See Mall of Am. Co. v. County of Hennepin, Nos. TC-16076, TC-21195, TC-
16772, TC-22440, TC-18309, 1995 WL 461069, at *3 (Minn. Tax Ct. Aug. 2, 1995).
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subject to discovery through a document request on the corporate
entity which is a party in the litigation. This is a fact-specific in-
quiry. 0 Thus, the specific corporate form or organization will not
necessarily be a roadblock to discovery:
A corporation is required to produce documents held by
its subsidiaries, even if the subsidiary is a foreign corpora-
tion and documents are located in a foreign country. This
rule applies to both foreign and domestic subsidiaries and
to predecessor corporations and subsidiaries. It does not
apply, however, to successor corporations that are now
separately owned. The rule also applies to documents in
possession of a so-called sister corporation, another sub-
sidiary of the non-party parent corporation of the party to
the action.8'
Likewise, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently recog-
nized, the party defendant need not have "legal control" to be obli-
gated to produce relevant documents:
We reject, as does the clear trend in the Federal cases, "le-
gal right to control" as the test for determining whether,
under Rule 34(a), a party may be made responsible for
producing materials not in its actual "possession [or] cus-
tody."... At least in cases such as this, where the nonliti-
gating corporations from whom information is sought are
related to the defendant through a single line of wholly
common ownership, the issue of control readily resolvesS 82
in favor of the party seeking that information.
The Massachusetts court fashioned the following rule:
The rule we adopt today attributes sufficient control for
purposes of requiring discovery whenever the claimant
has met his burden of showing that the information
sought is in the possession or custody of a wholly owning
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. ROGERS. HAYDocK& DAVID F. HERR, DIscovERY PRAcTcE § 5.6, at 5:8 (3d
ed. Supp. 1997) (citations omitted).
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parent (or virtually wholly owning) or wholly owned (or
virtually wholly owned) subsidiary corporation, or of a
corloration affiliated through such a parent or subsidi-
ary.
Any other rule would permit corporate defendants to hide
documents amongst its corporate affiliates:
To rule otherwise would be to reward corporations that
disperse potentially useful information among related en-
tities. When it suits their purposes they will share that in-
formation, but when adverse parties seek it out, they
would be able to throw up serious and perhaps impene-
trable barriers to effective discovery. That is not what the
rule contemplates. s4
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1145. The Massachusetts decision is consonant with well-settled law
from throughout the United States. See Japan Halon Co. v. Great Lakes Chem.
Corp., 155 F.R.D. 626, 628 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (requiring production from party's
parent corporations as there was "close coordination" between them); Camden
Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 138 F.R.D. 438, 441-42 (D.N.J. 1991)
("Federal courts construe 'control' very broadly under Rule 34" and that Rule 34
does not require an alter ego relationship) (citations omitted); Afros S.P.A. v.
Krauss-Maffei Corp., 113 F.R.D. 127, 131 (D. Del. 1986) ("It is obvious that the
particular form of the corporate relationship does not govern whether a party con-
trols documents.") (emphasis added); M.L.C., Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 109
F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The term 'control' is broadly construed" and
requiring production from non-party corporate parent"); Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[A party] cannot be
allowed to shield crucial documents from discovery by parties with whom it has
dealt in the United States merely by storing them with its affiliate abroad .... If
defendant could so easily evade discovery, every United States company would
have a foreign affiliate for storing sensitive documents."); Brunswick Corp. v. Su-
zuki Motor Co., 96 F.R.D. 684, 686 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (upholding interrogatories
requesting information from subsidiaries of parties because information "is avail-
able" to parties); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1153 (N.D. Ill.
1979). The Uranium court stated:
It is sufficient [to order production from U.S. party] that [the party] has,
or once had, control over its directors, officers and employees who man-
aged the ... activities of [the party] alone or of both corporations. [The
party] must produce all responsive documents held by those employees
or former employees, even if those documents have found their way into [a for-
eign affiliate's] files. The formalities separating the two corporations can-
not be used as a screen to disguise the coordinated nature of their... en-
terprise.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 631, 637
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The trial court agreed with Minnesota's argument that Philip
Morris' failure to search the files of its affiliates and subsidiaries
and produce all documents was "an egregious attempt to hide in-
formation relevant to this action."85 The court stated that it would
not tolerate Philip Morris' "attempts at hiding documents in the
morass of interlocking related organizations.
2. American Tobacco
American attempted similar corporate shell games. The litiga-
tion over American documents involved documents in the posses-
sion of its predecessor corporation, former corporate affiliates (in-
cluding one foreign affiliate), and its national law firm. The trial
court granted Minnesota's motion to compel production.87 Ameri-
can failed to comply with the order. The court then ordered that it
would hold a sanctions hearing if American persisted in noncom-. 88
pliance. After America's attempts to obtain appellate review of
that second order proved unsuccessful, 89 Minnesota then moved for
sanctions. The trial court granted that request, striking any claims
of privilege over certain documents and ordering their produc-
(D. Md. 1978) ("The fact that we are dealing with separate corporate entities here
is irrelevant .... [T]he nonparty status of the wholly owned subsidiaries does not
shield their documents from production."); Sol S. Turnoff Drug Distribs. Inc. v.
N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 55 F.R.D. 347, 349
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (upholding interrogatories regarding information in possession of
subsidiaries and predecessors in name of party); American Honda Motor Co. v.
Votour, 435 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (ordering production from
subsidiaries of party is not unreasonable).
85. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Regarding Philip Morris In-
ternational and Denying Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 9, 15 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Mar. 25, 1997) (citing Strom v. American Honda Motor Co., 667 N.E.2d 1137,
1141-45 (Mass. 1996)).
86. Id. at 16.
87. See Order Unsealing Certain Documents of Liggett Group, Inc., State ex
rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. CI-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8,1997).
88. See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Enforcement of Court's Order
of May 8, 1997 and Notice of Hearing Motion for Sanctions, State ex rel. Hum-
phrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 18,
1997).
89. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., Nos. C2-97-1109, C9-97-
1110, CO-97-1111 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 1997) (dismissing appeal and denying
petitions for extraordinary review); State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C2-97-1109 (Minn. Nov. 13, 1997) (denying petition for review).
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tion.90 In the end, however, American never fully complied with
the discovery orders. At the close of trial, the trial court instructed
the jury that they could draw a negative inference from American's
failure to produce the documents. 91 Upon settlement, the court
imposed an additional $400,000 sanction upon American and
B&W.
92
IV. DISCLOSURE OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S "PRIVILEGED"
DOCUMENTS AND THE BATTLE IN MINNESOTA OVER
APPLICATION OF THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
Prior to the Minnesota litigation, the tobacco industry had
successfully executed a strategy-directed by lawyers-of withhold-
ing important information on the health hazards of smoking under
improper claims of attorney-client privilege and work product pro-
tection. In the Minnesota litigation, the tactics of the industry and
their lawyers were exposed. After extended and intense litigation,
more than twenty trial court orders, and more than five appeals,
the industry's carefully-built wall of secrecy crumbled and more
90. See Order Imposing Sanctions Upon the American Tobacco Company
and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation as Successor by Merger to the
American Tobacco Company, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. Cl-
94-8565, slip op. at 8 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 1997). B&W and American were
also ordered to pay the Clerk of the Court the sum of $100,000 as a sanction. See
id. at 9.
91. The jury was instructed:
Prior to trial plaintiffs requested certain documents and answers to cer-
tain questions regarding research on smoking and health from American
Tobacco and Brown & Williamson, as successor by merger to American
Tobacco. After American Tobacco and Brown & Williamson failed to
produce the information, they were ordered to do so by this court.
American Tobacco and Brown & Williamson then violated that order
which required them to produce the documents and answer the ques-
tions in an unevasive answer. I now instruct you that you may draw a
negative inference from American Tobacco's and Brown & Williamson's
failures to provide the information ordered produced. You may assume
that if the information about American Tobacco's and Brown & William-
son's smoking-and-health research had been produced, it would have
been unfavorable to the positions taken by American Tobacco and
Brown & Williamson.
Transcript of Proceedings at 15661-62, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 6, 1998).
92. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at
2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998).
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than 39,000 documents withheld on claims of privilege were pro-
duced.93
Because the "privileged" documents disclosed in Minnesota
contain important scientific facts about the health consequences of
smoking and the industry's knowledge of these consequences, the
39,000 documents will have significance for the public health
community, governmental authorities and other litigants for dec-
ades to come.94 The documents will also have lasting implications
for the industry, particularly for its lawyers.
Leading experts on ethics and privilege have been shocked
and dismayed by the abuses of privilege uncovered in Minnesota.
Ethics expert Geoffrey Hazard noted that the documents disclosed
in Minnesota "will haunt the legal profession for a long time" be-
cause they "show perversion of the lawyer's role in counseling busi-
ness clients and exploitation of the attorney-client privilege to con-
ceal deception. 95 The director of the Minnesota Office of Lawyer
Professional Responsibility recently summed up the "misuse" of
privilege that occurred in the tobacco litigation as follows:
The solution adopted by the tobacco companies was to
have their "scientific" research conducted under the close
consultation, and sometimes under the management, of
their lawyers. The idea was that bad findings could be
held back as lawyer-client confidences, whereas good find-
ings could be described as the product of scientific in-
. 96quiry.
The director also suggested that the attorney behavior dis-
93. With limited exceptions, copies of the "privileged" documents ordered
produced in Minnesota can be found at the following Internet address:
<http://www.house.gov/commerce/TobaccoDocs/documents.html>. The docu-
ments were placed on the Internet after the industry turned them over to Con-
gress in response to a congressional subpoena issued as a result of the decisions in
the Minnesota tobacco litigation.
94. See Richard D. Hurt & Channing R Robertson, Prying Open the Door to the
Tobacco Industry's Secrets About Nicotine. The Minnesota Tobacco Tria4 280 JAMA 1173,
1173 (1998). "The recent release of previously protected attorney-client-privileged
documents, ordered to be produced [in Minnesota] on the basis of crime or
fraud, shed even more light on the industry's secrets." Id.
95. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Tobacco Lawyers Shame the Entire Profession, NAT'L L.J.,
May 18, 1998, at A22.
96. Edward J. Cleary, The Use and Abuse of the Attorney-Client Privilege, BENCH &
B. MINN., Sept. 1998, at 18.
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closed in the Minnesota litigation was "far more than an ethical vio-
lation; such conduct may well constitute obstruction of justice in
violation of the criminal code." 97 Legal ethics experts from Cali-
fornia agree.9s After reviewing the documents in Minnesota, they
concluded that:
[I] t is impossible, in our view, to argue credibly that law-
yers are acting ethically when they affirmatively advise their
tobacco clients to avoid taking steps that would substan-
tially reduce the number of people killed by tobacco. We
leave others to debate whether such advice should be
termed "criminal" or "fraudulent," but it is surely bereft of
any moral or legal justification.
The following section of this article describes the legal doc-
trines employed by Minnesota's counsel to pry open the industry's
secret "privileged" files. Particular focus is placed on the theory of
crime-fraud offered by plaintiffs and ultimately adopted by the spe-
cial master 1° and trial court. Finally, insight is provided into some
of the "new" facts revealed in the 39,000 documents produced, for
the first time to any litigant, on April 7, 1998.
A. Prologue to Disclosure
From very early on in the litigation, the industry was placed on
notice that its claims of privilege would be closely scrutinized and,
97. Id. at 19. Similar conclusions with respect to the documents disclosed in
Minnesota were reached by the author of leading treatises on attorney-client privi-
lege:
Further proceedings against the attorneys would be appropriate. The law
cannot give such a broad, absolute, and unlimited privilege to communi-
cations between clients and officers of the court and then tolerate any
knowing abuse of it by those officers.
Paul R. Rice, We Haven't Got a Secret Anymore: How the Tobacco Industry Lost Its Attor-
ney Client Privilege, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998, at 28.
98. See Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Ethics in Ashes: Big Tobacco's
Lawyers Hide Behind the Cloak of Privilege, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 46.
99. Id. at 49.
100. On March 25, 1997, Judge Fitzpatrick, pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 53,
appointed Mark W. Gehan, Jr., as special master for the purpose of rendering re-
ports regarding documents withheld from production on the grounds of privilege.
See Order Referring Certain Matters to a Special Master, State ex rel. Humphrey v.
Philip Morris Inc., No. CI-94-8565, slip op. at 2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 25, 1997).
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if necessary, challenged by the Minnesota plaintiffs. The message
to the industry from the outset was clear: the Minnesota plaintiffs
would seek to hold the industry accountable for any abuse of the
legal system. This issue was raised early because, even at that time,
the tobacco industry and its lawyers had gained a reputation for
abuse of privilege. The first court to closely examine the industry's
penchant for withholding scientific information under claims of
privilege was Judge Sarokin in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.' In
Haines, the district court judge found that the documents he re-
viewed in camera:
[S]peak for themselves in a voice filled with disdain for
the consuming public and its health. Despite the indus-
try's promise to engage independent researchers to ex-
plore the dangers of cigarette smoking and to publicize
their findings, the evidence clearly suggests that the re-
search was not independent; that potentially adverse re-
sults were shielded under the caption of "special projects;"
that the attorney-client privilege was intentionally em-
ployed to guard against such unwanted disclosure; and
that the promise of full disclosure was never meant to be
102honored and never was.
During the most recent wave of litigation, other courts found
that the tobacco companies have made invalid claims of privilege.
Indeed, virtually every court which reviewed the industry's allegedly
privileged documents in camera has found that at least some of the
documents are not privileged or are subject to disclosure under the
crime-fraud exception.103 Compared to Minnesota, however, only a
101. 140 F.R.D. 681, 695-96 (D.N.J. 1992).
102. Id. at 684. The Third Circuit reversed Judge Sarokin's decision on the
grounds that the judge had violated the Federal Magistrate Act. See Haines v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit also ordered
the case reassigned to another judge on remand in view of statements made in the
district court's prologue to its opinion. See id. at 98. In this prologue, the district
court stated, inter alia, "[T]he tobacco industry may be the king of concealment
and disinformation." Id. at 97. On remand, however, the plaintiffs' law firm, ex-
hausted by the industry's dilatory tactics, sought permission to withdraw, before
the claims of privilege were ever resolved. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F.
Supp. 414, 416 (D.N.J. 1993).
103. See, e.g., Florida v. American Tobacco Co., CL 95-1466 AX, slip op. at 4
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 1997) ("[The tobacco companies] utilized attorneys in carry-
ing out and planning fraudulent activities and undertook to misuse the attor-
ney/client relationship to keep secret research and other activities related to the
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handful of documents were ultimately ordered produced to the
plaintiffs in those cases.
Despite the clear warnings in Minnesota, the industry's lawyers
engaged in an indiscriminate dumping of thousands upon thou-
sands of documents on privilege logs. Before it was all over, the in-
dustry lawyers claimed privilege over more than 230,000 docu-
ments, including critical scientific documents on the health
hazards of smoking. Pursuant to the case management order en-
tered in the case during 1995, the parties were ordered to create
privilege logs providing information about documents withheld
104from discovery on grounds of privilege. Information required in-
cluded the author, recipients, date, subject matter description and
the basis for the privilege claim.
10 5
In most instances, the tobacco industry privilege logs were
vague and redundant. For example, RJR cursorily described the
subject matter of more than 6,800 allegedly privilege documents as
true health dangers of smoking."); Texas v. American Tobacco Co., No. 5:96-CV-
091, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1997) ("There is prima facie evidence that
the services of the tobacco industry lawyers were sought and/or obtained to enable
or aid one or more Defendants in committing or planning to commit the crimes,
frauds or other misconduct."); Washington v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-
15056-8 SEA, 1997 WL 728262, at *9 n.5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1997) ("[The]
chance that the public would be misled [by CTR Special Projects] and would be
unable to identify which research projects were directed by [tobacco companies]
to promote their legal, business, or public relations interests was so great as to give
rise to the inference of fraud."); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358,
363 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that 305 Liggett documents were not subject to an
underlying claim of privilege); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D.
491, 494 (D. Kan. 1997) (ordering production of several of RJR's documents, con-
cluding that the legal arguments proffered by RJR's counsel were clearly contrary
to any reasonable application of the attorney-client privilege or work product doc-
trine).
104. See Case Management Order, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 10 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 29, 1995).
105. See id. Specifically, the case management order provided that the follow-
ing information was to be listed for each document withheld from production on
a claim of privilege:
(a) Document production number;
(b) Date;
(c) Author;
(d) Addressees and recipients of copies;
(e) Type of document;
(f) Subject matter of document;
(g) Nature of claimed privilege (e.g. attorney-client; work product)
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only "scientific research," "smoking and health issues," or "scientists
and scientific research." Brown & Williamson provided the follow-
ing worthless subject matter description for hundreds of docu-
ments: "Confidential communication reflecting legal ad-
vice/request for legal advice."
As a result of this industry tactic, it was very difficult for Minne-
sota's counsel to document all of the privilege abuses. Though
privilege issues had been addressed since literally the first case
management order, litigation of the issue intensified in the fall of
1996, when Minnesota brought a motion arguing that when a party
asserting privilege provides an inadequate log, the claimed privi-
lege is waived. The trial court denied Minnesota's motion, but
issued a warning to defendants: "[T]he Court is concerned and
cautions the parties to provide sufficient information in their privi-
lege logs so that a reasoned decision can be made without in cam-
era review of an unreasonable percentage of documents .,107
The industry and its counsel, however, failed to heed the trial
court's warning and refused to describe the nature of their "privi-
leged" documents with any more detail.
Privilege was addressed again, in the spring of 1997, when the
State of Minnesota entered into a settlement agreement with the
smallest (by far) of the cigarette manufacturers, Liggett. A condi-
tion of the settlement included Liggett waiving all of its claims of
privilege. The non-Liggett industry defendants, however, objected
to production of approximately 2,400 of the Liggett privileged
documents, claiming that they were subject to a joint defense privi-
lege which could not unilaterally be waived by Liggett. 1s
106. Some courts have found that inadequate privilege logs result in waiver of
privilege. See, e.g., Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465,
474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that there "simply [was] not enough information
supplied to support the privilege claims," where a privilege log provided only "very
skeletal descriptions of 'subject'"); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij B.V. v. Apollo
Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1443-44 (D. Del. 1989) (finding plaintiff origi-
nally supplied "facially insufficient" descriptions of withheld documents to pro-
voke protection and that plaintiff would not be allowed to "embellish" the descrip-
tions later to avoid complying with defendant's discovery requests).
107. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Waive Privilege, State ex rel. Hum-
phrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 8,
1996). While denying plaintiffs' motion for waiver, the trial court agreed that "the
description of certain documents ... is arguably insufficient for Plaintiffs to rea-
sonably determine whether or not to challenge the claim. ... " Id. at 2-3.
108. "[T]he joint defense privilege cannot be waived without the consent of all
parties to the defense." See John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of United
Food & Comm'l Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 556 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Ohio-Sealy
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By order of March 28, 1997, the trial court directed the parties
to file memoranda of law in support of or in opposition to claims of
privilege and joint defense.' 9 The trial court also directed the in-
dustry to submit "such motions and affidavits as may be necessary to
support any claims of privilege" over the Liggett documents. Ex-
tensive briefs, affidavits, and exhibits (literally box-loads by the in-
dustry) were filed by both sides, and two days of hearings on privi-
lege and application of the crime-fraud exception were conducted
before the trial court on April 8 and 15, 1997. A discussion of the
theories advanced by Minnesota's counsel (and ultimately adopted
by the trial court) follow.
B. Legal Doctrines Employed by Minnesota to Expose Privilege
1. Purpose and Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communica-
tions between an attorney and a client where legal advice is-- lll
sought. Withholding documents under a claim of privilege is, as
the term reflects, a privilege which must be used with prudence to
ensure that there is no abuse. The purpose of the privilege is to
encourage communication between a client and attorney to "pro-
mote broader public interests in the observance of law and admini-
,,112stration ofjustice. The elements of the attorney-client privilegeare well established:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
Mattress Mfg. Co v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 29 (N.D. 111. 1980).
109. See Order Relating to Privilege Claims, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip
Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 1997).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENIT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 6-7 (3d ed. 1997). The attorney-client privilege is codi-
fied at Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subd. 1 (b), which states that privilege
can apply only to a "communication by the client to the attorney or the attorney's
advice given thereon in the course of professional duty." Minn. Stat. § 595.02
subd. 1 (b) (1998).
112. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also EPSTEIN,
supra note 111, at 2. "[T] he protection from compelled disclosure accorded to
the attorney-client relationship is predicated upon the tacit assumption that law-
yers are consulted for the purpose of abiding by, rather than devising means to
break, the law." Id.
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confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance per-
manently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
13
The industry took a very expansive view of privilege in the
Minnesota litigation, arguing that privilege protects any "confiden-
tial communication" between client and counsel, between counsel,
or even between client representatives. Properly viewed, however,
the privilege protects only one narrow category of confidential
communications, those that constitute "legal advice" from a legal
adviser acting "in his capacity as such."1
In Minnesota, privileges are narrowly construed because their
assertion results in the "suppression of relevant and essential evi-
dence." 5 Thus, the burden rests upon the party claiming privilege
to present facts demonstrating privilege. Litigants are not ex-
cused from this burden merely because of the magnitude of their
privilege claims:
Although it may be time-consuming to specifically assert
the attorney-client or work product privilege in document
intensive litigation, the courts nonetheless clearly require
such specific identification .... [T]he assertion of a privi-
lege.., is strictly construed. If the privilege is worth pro-
tecting, a litigant must be prepared to expend some time
to justify the assertion of the privilege.
Whether this burden is met is a question vested in the discre-
tion of the trial court.11
113. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 33, 62 N.W.2d 688, 700
(1954).
114. Id.; see also United States v. American Tel. & Tel., Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 615
n.3 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that, before any communication is privileged, it must
"involve application of law to facts or the rendering of an opinion of law in re-
sponse to the client's legal inquiries").
115. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 510, 75 N.W.2d 762, 771 (1956).
116. See In re Parkway Manor Healthcare Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989).
117. Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179,
183 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (citations omitted).
118. See Erickson v. MacArthur, 414 N.W.2d 406,407 (Minn. 1987).
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2. Only Legal Advice, Not Scientific Information, Can Be Subject to
the Attorney-Client Privilege
Based on industry conduct in prior litigation, Minnesota was
aware that the industry would attempt to hide its secrets regarding
the health hazards of cigarettes behind improper claims of privi-
lege. Even though Minnesota's counsel placed the industry on no-
tice early-on that such claims would be vigorously attacked, the in-
dustry took the imprudent path of claiming privilege over
thousands upon thousands of scientific research documents.
Through a meticulous review of the industry's privilege logs, plain-
tiffs were able to present the trial court with a litany of compelling
facts regarding the industry's improper behavior. For example,
plaintiffs' counsel determined that RJR had claimed privilege for
more than nineteen thousand documents regarding scientific re-
search into smoking and health, which represented approximately
forty percent of its privilege claims. Philip Morris listed on its log
more than five thousand documents either authored by or received
by its top-ranking scientists. Similarly, American Tobacco listed on
its privilege logs documents prepared by American researchers
(and sent to outside counsel) on the following smoking and health
topics:
* causes of lung disease
" research on chronic obstructive lung disease
* research on the alleged effect of smoking on cardiovas-
cular disease
* research on alleged effect of smoking on carbon dioxide
in the bloodstream
" research on arteriosclerosis
" ischemic heart disease and cigarette smoking 9
Minnesota argued that scientific information should not be
hidden from disclosure under claims of privilege. Such informa-
tion, Minnesota argued, would establish, among other things, the
knowledge the industry possessed about the hazards of cigarettes.
119. These descriptions appear in American Tobacco Company's privilege log
which is available to the public in a computer-searchable format at the Minnesota
Depository. The Minnesota Depository holds seven privilege logs, one for each
defendant in the Minnesota litigation.
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The attorney-client privilege extends solely to legal advice
from a legal advisor acting in a legal capacity.2 Similarly, the work
product doctrine protects only information "primarily concerned
with legal assistance."'2' Thus, an attorney making or receiving the
allegedly privileged communication must do so in the capacity of a
lawyer. Before any communication is privileged, it must "involve
application of law to facts or the rendering of an opinion of law in
response to the client's legal inquiries.'
2 2
Neither the attorney-client nor work product protection ap-
plies to communications made in the ordinary course of business.
When lawyers direct factual investigations, they are often acting in a
business, not a legal, capacity.14 Thus, "the attorney-client privilege
does not protect client communications that relate only to business
or technical data.' 125 This information is discoverable because a
"litigant cannot shield from discovery the knowledge it possessed by
claiming it had been communicated to a lawyer; nor can a litigant
refuse to disclose facts simply because that information came from
a lawyer.",2 6 Indeed, there are "few, if any, conceivable circum-
stances where a scientist or engineer employed to gather data"
should be viewed as falling within the privilege.
120. See Brown v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 33, 62 N.W.2d 688, 700
(1954).
121. In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 520 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
122. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 615 n.3 (D.D.C.
1980).
123. See Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 552-53, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1942),
overruled in part on other grounds by Leer v. Chicago, St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 308 N.W.2d
305 (Minn. 1981).
124. See Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lilly, 112 F.R.D. 160, 163-64 (D. Minn. 1986)
(noting that, where the investigation by in-house counsel included non-legal opin-
ions and thoughts about the facts, as opposed to legal or trial matters, it was "ordi-
nary business... outside the scope of... privileges").
125. Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987).
126. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemn. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d
Cir. 1994); see also Crowe v. Lederle Lab., 510 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (N.Y. App. 1986)
(scientific reports conducted to "monitor complaints," even if also used in litiga-
tion, are discoverable).
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3. Scientific Information Simply Transferred to Attorneys Is Not
Privileged
Time and again, the industry claimed privilege over research
documents that were prepared by scientists and sent to other scien-
tists, but were also received by in-house counsel. For example,
Brown & Williamson claimed privilege for approximately 6,000
documents containing underlying factual information that was
simply transferred to counsel, purportedly to "facilitate the rendi-
tion of' legal advice.
Minnesota argued that the industry was abusing privilege by
funneling otherwise discoverable scientific information through its
lawyers. Courts have concluded that "counsel cannot suppress evi-
dence by taking possession of it."28 The attorney-client and work
product protections are "never available to allow a corporation to
funnel its papers and documents into the hands of its lawyers for
custodial purposes and thereby avoid disclosure."129 Information,
including scientific research, does not become privileged by virtue
of being filtered through attorneys.130 Nor does scientific informa-
tion become privileged merely because it is incorporated into a
communication between an attorney and client. 31 Legal depart-
ments "are not citadels in which public, business or technical in-
19132formation may be placed to defeat discovery ....
4. Limitations upon Work Product Protection over Scientific
Research
Minnesota's review of the privilege logs also revealed that the
industry was over-designating scientific research as work product.
Under the work product doctrine, documents or tangible things
prepared in anticipation of litigation are subject to a qualified im-
munity.13 3 The United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor
34
128. PAUL RICE, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 7.11,
at 525 (1993).
129. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.
1963).
130. See id.
131. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).
132. Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987).
133. Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26.02(c), like its federal coun-
terpart, allows discovery of work product in some circumstances:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things...
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described the limited nature of this protection: "We do not mean
to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adver-
sary's counsel with an eyze toward litigation are necessarily free from
discovery in all cases."1
Thus, like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doc-
trine protects only information primarily concerned with legal ad-
vice.1sr Moreover, work product protection does not extend to in-
vestigations conducted in the ordinary course of business. " Nor
do pre-existing documents become "work product" just because
they were reviewed by an attorney in preparation for litigation.138
There are two species of work product. First, fact work product (of-
ten referred to as "ordinary" work product) is discoverable if the
party seeking production can show "substantial need" and "undue
hardshig" in obtaining the materials or their equivalent by other
means. The second type of work product consists of "mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of a party concerning the litigation."14° This
opinion work product is given heightened protection.
Whether particular information is protected, or whether quali-
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's
attorney,..) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials... and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
Id. (emphasis added).
134. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
135. Id. at511.
136. See In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 519 (N.D.
Ill. 1990); see also United States v. Construction Prods. Research Inc, 73 F.3d 464,
473 (2d Cir. 1996) (party claiming work product must show documents "were pre-
pared principally or exclusively to assist" in litigation).
137. See Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C.
1982).
138. See, e.g., EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 124 (2d ed. 1989). Other courts have
also found that the mere fact that an attorney has gathered or selected documents
from pre-existing documents does not convey work product protection to that ac-
tivity. In Compagnie Francaise, the district court questioned whether documents ob-
tained from third parties by a party's counsel were protected by the work product
doctrine. See Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105
F.R.D. 16, 40-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Surveying the cases on this issue, the court
found that pre-existing documents, even when selectively assembled by counsel in
preparation for trial, are not protected. See id. at 41-42.
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fled protection has been overcome, lies within the trial court's dis-
cretion.14' This discretion must be exercised with the function of
work product protection in mind. The boundaries of the doctrine
are mapped by balancing the interest in providing lawyers with "a
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by op-
posing parties and their counsel," against the societal interest in
ensuring that the parties obtain "[m]utual knowledge of all the
relevant facts... gathered.' '142 The policy behind the rule is not to
give the attorney special protections, but rather to protect the ad-
versary trial process. The work product privilege exists "to pro-
mote the adversary process, not to pervert it."'4
In other words, the protection cannot be used as a sword
rather than a shield. In Boldt v. Sanders,145 the Minnesota Supreme
Court found that overbroad protection will encourage "the 'poker
hand' concept of litigation, rewarding artifice and camouflage.
" 46
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated to re-
duce exactly those types of tactics.
14
1
5. Scientific Inquiry into Health Hazards of a Product Is Not Work
Product
Scientific inquiry concerning a product is seldom predomi-
nantly for the purposes of litigation. Merely involving an attorney
in non-legal matters does not transform such information into work
product Moreover, some courts have recognized that a manufac-
turer has a special duty, apart from litigation, to keep abreast of the
hazards posed by its products. 49 Accordingly, Minnesota argued
141. See In re Indenture of Trust, 437 N.W.2d 430, 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(asserting that it is the trial court "familiar with the case" who is "in the best posi-
tion" to determine the substantial need/undue hardship calculus of Rule 26.02).
142. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 510-11 (1947).
143. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
144. EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 138, at 151.
145. 261 Minn. 160, 111 N.W.2d 225 (1961).
146. Id. at 164, 111 N.W.2d at 227-28.
147. See id. at 164, 111 N.W.2d at 227.
148. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1051 (D.
Del. 1985) ("[F]actual recitations of technical data and research experiments
conducted by Carbide's employees" is not work product even if "the documents
were prepared by or forwarded to Carbide's in-house counsel").
149. SeeJenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 278 (E.D. Tex. 1985),
affd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). The Minnesota Civil Jury Instruction Guides
provide that "You are instructed that the manufacturer is obligated to keep in-
formed of scientific knowledge and discoveries in its field." MINNEsoTA DIST.
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that research that resulted from this duty-the scientific informa-
tion establishing the knowledge possessed by a manufacturer about
its products-should be discoverable.
50
6. The Use of "Litigation Consultants" Cannot Shield Scientific
Research as Work Product
The tobacco industry attempted to justify its claims of work
product over some internal scientific documents by arguing that
the company scientists who authored the documents were acting as
"consultants" to their attorneys. Minnesota presented law demon-
strating that the predicate of this claim-that in-house scientists or
employees are somehow experts or consultants for the purposes of
litigation-has disturbed many courts.15' "There is a legitimate con-
cern that a party may try to immunize its employees who are actors
or viewers [in or of the events giving rise to a cause of action]
against proper discovery by designating them experts retained for
JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCrION GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 117 (Michael K. Steenson, rep.) in 4 MINN. PRACrICE 1, 83 (3d
ed. 1986). In addition to the caselaw, Minnesota also relied on documents pro-
duced in discovery where the industry itself had recognized this duty. For in-
stance, one Philip Morris document produced in the Minnesota litigation stated
that "[t]he industry should abandon its past reticence with respect to medical re-
search," because "failure to do such research could give rise to negligence
charges." PM 1000335622.
150. In a similar circumstance in the asbestos litigation, a court required the
defendant to produce information-including information in the hands of ex-
perts-concerning the manufacturer's knowledge of the health hazards of asbes-
tos. See Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D 292, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("If
[defendant] has knowledge of the matters requested.., and has employed ex-
perts whom [defendant] does not expect to call at trial, the interrogatory should
be answered anyway, for this information is directed at learning the extent of [de-
fendant's] knowledge of asbestos and asbestos-related diseases ... ."); see also Soe-
der v. General Dynamics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 253, 255 (D. Nev. 1980) (holding that
product investigations motivated by a desire to improve the product, guard against
adverse publicity, or protect a company's economic interests are not protected);
Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Southwestern Roofing & Sheeting Co., 29 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 1095, 1097 (D. Colo. 1980) (holding that documents regarding defective
roof were not work product because their purpose was to identify roofing prob-
lems).
151. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68
F.R.D. 397, 405 (E.D. Va. 1975) ("[Wlork performed and the reports made by in-
house experts was not the work product of lawyers."); Union Carbide, 619 F. Supp.
at 1051 ("[Flactual recitations of technical data and research experiments con-
ducted by Carbide's employees is not work product even if the documents were
prepared by or forwarded to Carbide's in-house counsel.").
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,12work on the case."' 5 Thus, "courts should be exceedingly skeptical
when employees who have otherwise discoverable information are
designated 'experts' and efforts must be made to preserve the or
portunity for the opposing party to discover that information."
The industry also tried to shield scientific information by arguing
that it was generated or used by defendants' consulting experts. A
litigant is not permitted, however, to hide facts given to a consult-
ant or expert under a claim of work product.14
C. The Crime-Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine
Even if a document is properly privileged, the crime-fraud ex-
ception to privilege may require its production. The guiding prin-
ciple of the crime-fraud exception is that communications that fa-
cilitate the commission of crimes or frauds are not worthy of
protection. As the United States Supreme Court stated in the
seminal case of Clark v. United States-5 "The privilege takes flight if
the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice
that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help
from the law. He must let the truth be told.'
5 6
The crime-fraud exception applies to ongoing or future crimes
or fraud, the assumption being that the advice is being sought in
order to achieve the illegal act. In contrast, legal advice sought to
determine how to deal with a past fraud or crime may be privi-
leged.'
.,152. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2033,
at 466 (2d ed. 1994); see also 2 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINN. PRACTICE
§ 26.02, at 28 (2d ed. 1985) (information obtained from regular employee "ex-
perts," as opposed to specially retained experts, is available through routine dis-
covery processes).
153. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 152, § 2033, at 466.
154. See Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 994
(D.C. Cir. 1980). "[Flacts given by the party to the expert can no more be pro-
tected by that fact than facts given to counsel by a party can be brought within the
attorney client privilege." Id. (citing 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 26.66[2] (2d ed. 1976)).
155. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
156. Id. at 15.
157. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172
(D.S.C. 1974), affd, 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
158. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (attorney-client privi-
lege "ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, namely, where the desired advice re-
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Prior to the tobacco litigation, there were few Minnesota deci-
sions on the crime-fraud exception. In 1979, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court stated, without mentioning the doctrine by name,
that "privilege is not permitted to prevent disclosure of communi-
cations relating to commission of future crime or fraud."5 9 More
recently, in Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co.,"' the Minnesota Court of Appeals
adopted the "prima facie" standard of proof and the common two-
part test for application of the exception: "To invoke the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, Levin must estab-
lish a prima facie showing that the communication was (1) in fur-
therance of a crime or fraud and (2) was closely related to the
fraud."161
The "crime-fraud" exception is a flexible concept that courts
throughout the country have applied beyond those circumstances
where the technical definition of "crime" or "fraud" is met.162 For
instance, other conduct such as torts or bad faith breach of duty
may suffice. 16 In the Minnesota litigation, the industry strenuously
argued that plaintiffs were required to prove all elements of com-
mon law fraud, including reliance, before the crime-fraud excep-
159. Kahl v. Minnesota Wood Specialty, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn.
1979).
160. 469 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
161. Id. Other courts have also adopted the "prima facie" standard for appli-
cation of the crime-fraud exception to privilege. See In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d
548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980) (ruling that party "is not required to prove the existence
of crime or fraud" as a prima facie showing is sufficient); In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d
622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The question here is not whether the evidence sup-
ports a verdict but whether it calls for inquiry."); Duplan, 540 F.2d at 1220
("[W] hile a prima facie showing need not be such as to actually prove the disputed
fact, it must be such as to subject the opposing party to the risk of non-persuasion
if the evidence as to the disputed fact is left unrebutted.").
162. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 232 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he ex-
ception applies not only to crimes and fraud, but to other intentional torts."); In re
Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying the exception to "crime,
fraud, or other misconduct"); United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 86 F.R.D. 603,
624-25 (D.D.C. 1979) (any "wrongful purpose," including "crime, fraud or tort" or
antitrust violation); Cooksey v. Hilton Int'l Co., 863 F. Supp. 150, 151 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (exception applies to "intentional torts moored in fraud"); Volcanic Gar-
dens Management Co. v. Paxson, 847 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App. 1993) (stating
that, for purposes of the exception, "fraud" is "much broader" than common law
and criminal fraud); Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 794 P.2d 595, 598
(Ala. 1990) (holding that public policy demands a broader interpretation of fraud
as it relates to the exception to the attorney-client privilege).
163. See In reA.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2, 14-15 (D. Kan. 1985) (finding that
the crime-fraud exception applies to ongoing concealment and misrepresentation
of the hazards of a product).
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tion to privilege would apply.164 This requirement, however, cannot
be reconciled with the long line of authority holding that the
crime-fraud exception does not require a completed crime or
fraud, but rather can be applied where an attorney's communica-
tions enable or assist a party in planning a crime or fraud.' 65
Typically, the party seeking discovery under the crime-fraud
exception need make only a "prima facie" showing of one of these
categories of wrongdoing that constitutes "crime-fraud. 166 Recent
cases have interpreted this standard to mean that only a "founda-
tion in fact" sufficient to support the allegation of fraud and that
the communication was made in furtherance of that fraud is neces-167 ...
sary. This showing is less than is required to substantively prove a
crime or a cause of action for fraud. Requiring a stricter showing
"may not be possible at the discovery stage, and would result in an
overzealous protection of the attorney-client privilege in a context
where the rationale for that privilege may be inapplicable. 69
Thus, a finding that the crime-fraud exception applies in the dis-
covery context does not constitute a substantive finding that a party
164. A minority of courts have held that, to prove the crime-fraud exception in
discovery, a party has to prove every element of a substantive cause of action for
fraud. See, e.g., Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Tech. Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 423 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
165. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that the proponent of the crime-fraud exception does not have to establish the
essential elements of a crime or fraud "beyond a reasonable doubt, since the
crime-fraud exception does not require a completed crime or fraud but only that the
client ha[s] consulted the attorney in an effort to complete one") (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted); see also In reAndrews, 186 B.R. 219, 222 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1995) (explaining that the opponent "does not have to conclusively prove the
elements of the purported crime or fraud" but only show client intended crime or
fraud).
166. See Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W. 2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
Other courts have phrased the "prima facie" requirement differently. See Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 692 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting that courts recog-
nize the phrases "probable cause" or "prima facie showing" are interchangeable
because both "require a person have a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a crime or fraud, and that the communications were
in furtherance thereof." Essentially, "all of these proposed standards amount to
the same basic proposition-has the party seeking discovery presented evidence
which, if believed by the fact-finder, supports plaintiffs theory of fraud?").
167. See Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 32-33 (Colo. 1982).
168. See In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980) (party "is not
required to prove existence of crime or fraud" as a prima facie showing is suffi-
cient); see also In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1988); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, 540 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976).
169. Caldwell 644 P.2d at 32-33.
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is guilty of a crime or liable for fraud. 70
Cases analogous to the tobacco litigation-involving the safety
of a product-have established that the crime-fraud exception ap-
plies to documents related to a manufacturer's knowledge and mis-
representations regarding health hazards. In In re A.H. Robins,' a
case involving the Dalkon Shield IUD, the court found that the
crime-fraud exception applied to documents relating to the follow-
ing categories of behavior by the defendant:
[Robins] failed to adequately test the Dalkon Shield be-
fore marketing it; attempted to develop hard evidence
that misrepresented the nature, quality, safety and efficacy
of the Dalkon Shield; ignored the mounting evidence
against the Dalkon Shield, with knowledge of the poten-
tial harm caused by the product; relied upon invalid stud-
ies in an effort to refute or ignore the dangers potentially
caused by the Dalkon Shield; and attempted, with the as-
sistance of counsel, to devise strategies to cover up Robins'
responsibilities and lessen its liability with respect to the
Dalkon Shield.1
72
Additionally, attempts by Robins to "neutralize adverse public-
ity and comment" were found to constitute "crime-fraud."
7
1
Dilatory discovery tactics also was a factor considered by the
court in the A.H. Robins decision. The court surveyed various Dal-
kon Shield personal injury cases, finding a pattern by the defen-
dant of delaying discovery "with stalling tactics, such as motions for
reconsideration, requests for stays or attempted appeals of discov-
ery orders.' 74 Finding that the ultimate goal of this pretrial postur-
ing was to avoid producing documents, the court held that "the re-
peated delays and instances of nonproduction provide support for
the application of the crime or fraud exception."175 This portion of
the A.H. Robins decision held great significance for the Minnesota
plaintiffs, since the tobacco industry had dragged its feet and stone-
170. See In reA.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2,15-16 (D. Kan. 1985).
171. 107 F.R.D. 2 (D. Kan. 1985).
172. Id. at 14-15.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Id. at 14.
175. Id. at 14; See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the At-
torney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1978) (asserting that illegitimate
litigation tactics may constitute crime-fraud).
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walled in nearly every aspect of discovery-including withholding• 176
more than 230,000 documents as privileged.
In another case involving the Dalkon Shield IUD, a federal
court of appeals similarly found "a pervasive picture of covering up
a defective product and continuing to merchandise it by misrepre-
senting both its efficacy and its safety," and stated that "this kind of
continuing fraudulent misrepresentation and cover-up vitiates not
only any attorney-client privilege but also any work product immu-
nity.
177
The process for adjudicating the crime-fraud exception is fairly
well established. Before a court may order that allegedly privileged
documents be submitted for in camera review to determine crime-
fraud, the party challenging privilege usually demonstrates "'a fac-
tual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable
person' ... that in camera review of the materials may reveal evi-
dence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception ap-
plies.", 17  Whether a showing sufficient to trigger an in camera in-
spection has been made rests in the discretion of the trial court.79
Next, the court must determine whether there is a "prima fa-
cie" showing that the allegedly privileged communications were
made in furtherance of a crime or fraud so This determination may
be made based on a review of the evidence in camera.18' As part of
the determination of a prime facie case of crime-fraud, the Varty
asserting the privilege is afforded an opportunity to be heard. An
opportunity to be heard does not necessarily mean mini-trials for
each and every document challenged. 1 3 For example, in In re A.H.
176. See supra notes 6-45 and accompanying text (detailing the industry's abu-
sive discovery behavior).
177. Craig v. A.H. Robins Co., 790 F.2d 1, 2-4 (1st Cir. 1986).
178. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (citing Caldwell v. District
Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)).
179. See id. "Once that showing is made, the decision whether to engage in in
camera review rests in the sound discretion of the district court." Id.
180. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987);
Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
181. In Zolin, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an in camera review
of the documents can be used to substantiate the allegations of crime or fraud suf-
ficient to pierce privilege. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
182. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992).
183. See EPSTEIN, supra note 111, at 265. "Must an adversary hearing be held to
determine whether there is a prima facie case? Apparently not. At least one court
has said it is not necessary to hold a mini-trial." Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987)).
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Robins, the court found that the compelling interest of efficient
administration of the courts justified the court's reliance on legal
memoranda-as opposed to an evidentiary hearing-to find that
allegedly privileged documents were discoverable under the crime-
fraud exception.
Once the court determines that the required prima facie case
has been demonstrated, the question becomes the extent to which
privilege has been lost. Any document "closely related" to the
crime or fraud loses its privilege.8 6 Whether documents are "in
furtherance of' or "closely related to" the crime-fraud is vested in
the discretion of the court.87 The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in
Levin, found that "[a]pplication of the crime-fraud exception• • • ,,188
should not be based on a rigid analysis. Other courts also have
found that the standard is flexible. In In re Sealed Case,'90 Judge
Skelly Wright stated:
The point is not to convict anyone of a crime or to antici-
pate the grand jury, but only to determine whether the
possibility that a privileged relationship has been abused is
sufficient to alter the balance of costs and benefits that
supports the privilege. In making this determination
courts will not be able to receive a complete adversary
presentation of the issues, since one of the parties will not
be privy to the information at issue. Any system that re-
quires courts to make highly refined judgments-perhaps
concerning volumes of documents-will most likely col-
lapse under its own weight. 9'
The crime-fraud exception, once established, applies not only
to the attorney-client privilege but also to the work product doc-
trine, including opinion work product."' Similarly, it vitiates any
184. 107 F.R.D. 2 (D. Kan. 1986).
185. See id. at 15.
186. See Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W. 2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that the "requirement that legal advice must be related to the client's criminal
or fraudulent conduct should not be interpreted restrictively.").
190. 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
191. Id. at 814.
192. See In reDoe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981) ("[T]here is a fraud ex-
ception to the opinion work product doctrine."); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
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claim ofjoint-defense or common-interest privilege.
9 3
D. The Evidence of Crime-Fraud Presented in Minnesota
In the spring of 1997, after it became clear that the industry
was improperly hiding thousands of documents regarding smoking
and health behind claims of privilege, Minnesota's counsel set
about establishing the crime-fraud exception to privilege. Using
documents produced in discovery T9 and the privilege logs, Minne-
sota presented evidence that the industry had engaged in a dec-
ades-long campaign to suppress scientific knowledge about the
dangers of smoking, manipulated evidence of its knowledge of
those dangers to conceal it from the public and the courts, and in-
tentionally breached its duties to the public to truthfully research
and report those dangers. 195 This evidence, Minnesota argued, es-
tablished a prima facie case of crime-fraud that defeated privilege.
1. What the Tobacco Industry Promised
The heart of the crime-fraud case was the tobacco industry's
long-standing denial and minimization of the health risks of smok-
ing. The illegal conduct and conspiracy began in the 1950s, when
the industry was confronted with several scientific studies which
sounded grave warnings on the health hazards of cigarettes. On
January 4, 1954, the industry jointly announced the formation of
the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (later known as the
Council for Tobacco Research, or "CTR") in an advertisement ti-
tled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers." 196 This advertise-
ment appeared in newspapers throughout the country, including
Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, MN. The advertisement stated:
F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986).
193. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1992).
194. Even though the industry had been in litigation for more than forty years,
many of the documents used by Minnesota had never been produced in prior liti-
gation.
195. Prior to the Minnesota litigation, privilege battles in other tobacco cases
had focused on the Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR") and its Special Projects
division. In Minnesota, however, fewer than 10% of the documents claimed as
privileged directly involved these topics. It was clear from an examination of the
privilege logs that the industry and its counsel were hiding thousands of docu-
ments regarding smoking and health behind a wall privilege. As a result, Minne-
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We accept an interest in people's health as a basic re-
sponsibility, paramount to every other consideration in
our business.
We believe the products we make are not injurious to
health.
We always have and always will cooperate closely with
those whose task it is to safeguard the public health.
Many people have asked us what we are doing to meet
the public's concern aroused by the recent reports. Here
is the answer:
1. We are pledging aid and assistance to the re-
search effort into all phases of tobacco use and
health. This joint financial aid will of course be in
addition to what is already being contributed by indi-
vidual companies.
2. For this purpose we are establishing ajoint indus-
try group consisting initially of the undersigned. This
group will be known as TOBACCO INDUSTRY
RESEARCH COMMITTEE.
3. In charge of the research activities of the Com-
mittee will be a scientist of unimpeachable integrity
and national repute. In addition there will be an Ad-
visory Board of scientists disinterested in the cigarette
industry .... 9'
Over the years, the industry continued to renew the pledge set
forth in the Frank Statement:
* In 1962: "We in the tobacco industry recognize a special re-
sponsibility to help science determine the facts. And we believe
we are fulfilling this responsibility through the Tobacco• ,,198
Industry Research Committee.
* In 1970: "In the interest of absolute objectivity, the to-
bacco industry has supported totally independent re-
search efforts with completely non-restrictive funding ....
197. Id. The Frank Statement was signed by every leading U.S. manufacturer
of cigarettes, except Liggett. See id. Liggett did notjoin the rest of the industry in
CTR until 1964, and resigned in the late 1960s.
198. PM 1005136955 (Tobacco Institute press release) (emphasis added).
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The findings are not secret."'99
* In 1971: "Any organization in a position to apply re-
sources in the search for those keys-and which fails to do
so-will continue to be guilty of cruel neglect of those
"200
whom it pretends to serve.
i In 1972: "If our product is harmful, we'll stop making
it.,201
* In 1982: "Since the first questions were raised about
smoking as a possible health factor, the tobacco industry has
believed that the American people deserve objective, scientific an-
swers. The industry has committed itself to this task. 
02
One way in which the industry publicly stated that it would ful-
fill the promises in the Frank Statement was through the auspices
of the CTR.0 5 A litany of secret internal documents produced in
Minnesota demonstrated, however, that top officials from the to-
bacco industry privately acknowledged that CTR was meant to serve
primarily a public relations function and that CTR scientific re-
search was of little value in addressing smoking and health issues:
* In 1958, the British equivalent of CTR, the Tobacco
Research Council ("TRC"), concluded after a visit to the
United States that "CTR supports only fundamental re-




Moreover, TRC reported that the U.S. Tobacco industry
scientists viewed the research sponsored by CTR with
cynicism: "[B]oth L&M [Liggett] and Lorillard scientists
told us quite bluntly that they considered TRC research
was on the correct basis and CTR's largely without value.
It is unlikely that company scientists would speak so
frankly unless they were pretty sure their principals held




199. TIMN 0081352 (Tobacco Institute advertisement) (emphasis added).
200. LG 0069279 (Tobacco Institute press release).
201. RJR 500324163 (quoting James Bowling, a vice president of Philip Mor-
ris).
202. B&W 670500618 (Tobacco Institute pamphlet) (emphasis added).
203. See CTR MN 11309817. CTR stands for Council for Tobacco Research -
U.S.A., Inc., an industry trade group that the industry publicly proclaimed was es-
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* In 1967, a senior Liggett scientist criticized CTR re-
search as only "peripheral" to the problem of smoking
and health:
[T]he tobacco industry has a very serious prob-
lem.... Although this problem has public relations,
business, legal and political components, it is basically
a scientific one. So far, however, the major efforts of the
industry to cope with this problem have been other than sci-
entific. Most of the CTR and AMA pograms have only a
peripheral connection to tobacco use.
* In 1970, a senior scientist of Philip Morris, in a memo-
randum to the president of that company, set forth the
real purpose of CTR-to create doubt about the smoking
and health charge:
It has been stated that CTR is a program to find out
"the truth about smoking and health." What is truth
to one is false to another. CTR and the Industry have
publicly and frequently denied what others find as
"truth." Let's face it. We are interested in evidence
which we believe denies the allegations that ciga-
ret[te] smoking causes disease.
* A 1970 document discloses that another top Philip
Morris scientist also questioned the worth of CTR re-
search: "Osdene's view (Philip Morris' view?) was that
C.T.R. did virtually no useful work and cost a vast amount
of money.
20 8
* In 1973, a BAT report on a visit to the United States
called CTR a "backwater of little significance in the world
of smoking and health."
2 0 9
206. Liggett 208294-95 (emphasis added).
207. PM 2022200161.
208. BAT 110316204. Dr. Thomas Osdene was a senior research and devel-
opment scientist at Philip Morris. During his deposition in the Minnesota litiga-
tion, Dr. Osdene declined to answer more than 100 questions on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds. See generally Transcript of Deposition of Thomas S. Osdene, vols. 1
& 2, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
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e In 1975, Addison Yeaman, the director of CTR, re-
ferred cynically to CTR as "the best and cheapest insur-
ance the tobacco industry can buy and without it the in-
dustry would have to invent CTR or would be dead.
210
Minnesota presented extensive evidence that, rather than
conducting objective research and reporting the results to the pub-
lic as promised, the industry carried on a public relations effort
aimed at creating doubt about the connection between smoking
and disease. This strategy is described in a 1972 Tobacco Institute
memorandum:
For nearly twenty years, this industry has employed a sin-
gle strategy to defend itself on three major fronts-litiga-
tion, politics and public opinion. While the strategy was
brilliantly conceived and executed,... it is not-nor was it
intended to be-a vehicle for victory. On the contrary, it has
always been a holding strategy, consisting of. creating doubt
about the health charge without actually denying it ....
Thus, the tobacco industry issued public statements-year af-
ter year-aimed at "creating doubt about the health charge" :
212
* In 1969: "[TIhere is no demonstrated causal relationship be-
tween smoking and any disease. If anything, the pure bio-
logical evidence is pointing away from, not toward, the
causal hypothesis."
* In 1970: "The deficiencies of the tobacco causation hypothesis
and the need of much more research are becoming clearer to
increasing numbers of research scientists."
2 1 4
* In 1972: "After millions of dollars and over twenty




9 In 1972: "[T]he 1972 report of the Surgeon Gen-
eral... 'insults the scientific community'.... [Tihe num-
210. Lorillard 03539541-42.
211. Lorillard 87657703 (emphasis added).
212. Id.
213. B&W 670307882 (CTR press release) (emphasis added).
214. RJR 500015902 (CTR press release) (emphasis added).
215. TIMN 81352 (Tobacco Institute advertisement) (emphasis added).
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ber one health problem is not cigarette smoking, but is the extent to
which public health officials may knowingly mislead the Ameri-
can public.
2 16
* In 1978: "Are we on the brink of paranoia?... Theflat
assertion that smoking causes lung cancer and heart disease and




It has been stated so often that smoking causes can-
cer, it's no wonder most people believe this is an es-
tablished fact. But, in fact, it is nothing of the kind.
The truth is that almost three decades of research
have failed to produce scientific proof for this claim
.... In our opinion, the issue of smoking and lung cancer
218is not a closed case. It's an open controversy.
219
" In 1984: "[Slcience has failed to establish a causal link.
* In 1995: "It has not been scientifically established that
smoking causes any type of cancer."
2 0
2. What the Industry Had Discovered
In striking contrast to the tobacco industry's public statements,
Minnesota presented evidence-from newly-disclosed internal
memos-that industry scientists had secretly recognized the health
221
hazards and addictiveness of cigarettes. In fact, as early as 1958,
most of the industry believed that smoking causes lung cancer:
e In 1958, three British scientists visited top officials and
scientists in the U.S. tobacco industry, including those at
216. TIMN 120602 (Tobacco Institute press release) (emphasis added).
217. RJR 500184776 (Tobacco Institute pamphlet) (emphasis added).
218. RJR 504638051 (RJR advertisement) (emphasis added).
219. RJR 502371215 (RJR's statement on ABC Nightline) (emphasis added).
220. Responses of Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company to Plaintiffs'
First Set of Requests for Admission at 2, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris
Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. undated). Similar denials were provided by
all other defendants.
221. The industry knew that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to the health
of the smoker even prior to the publication of the Frank Statement in 1954. See
supra notes 25-26 accompanying text (describing 1953 Teague document).
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TIRC, Liggett, Philip Morris and American Tobacco.
One object of this visit was to find out "the extent in which
it is accepted that cigarette smoke 'causes' lung cancer.",
23
These British scientists reported widespread acceptance of
causation: "With one exception (H.S.N. Greene) [not
formally affiliated with any tobacco company] the indi-
viduals whom we met believed that smoking causes lung
cancer if by "causation" we mean any chain of events
which leads finally to lung cancer and which involves
smoking as an indispensable link.
224
* Further confirmations that smoking caused disease
were found in other industry documents. For example, in
1959, a top RJR scientist, Alan Rodgman, concluded that
for the polycyclic hydrocarbons identified by RJR in ciga-
rette smoke, "there is a distinct possibility that these substances
would have a carcinogenic effect on the human respiratory sys-
tem" and that "it would be better for the consumer if ciga-
rette smoke were devoid of such compounds."
25
o In 1962, Rodgman concluded that "the amount of
evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoke as a
health hazard is overwhelming," while "[t]he evidence
challenging the indictment is scant.,226
e In 1962, BAT recognized at an internal smoking and
health conference, attended by its subsidiary B&W, that
cigarettes were addictive: "[S]moking is a habit of addic-
tion that is pleasurable ....
These documents are of particular significance since they were
written prior to the seminal 1964 surgeon general's report. Minne-
sota also presented extensive evidence of internal confirmations of
causation that post-dated 1964:
o In 1964, after publication of the first surgeon gen-
eral's report, the head of research at Philip Morris,
Helmut Wakeham, noted the "professional approach" of
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"embrace the health area" and "severely reduce[] reliance
on TIRC and TI .... Wakeham recommended that
management "[a]dopt as internal policy for technical
purposes the view that greater benefit will accrue from ac-
cepting the report's findings on face value and proceed-
ing to cure the ills, real and alleged as they may be, than
from enagin.g in disputation and refutation of these
claims. Indeed, Wakeham cautioned, failure by the in-
dustry to conduct such research "could give rise to negli-
gence charges."
230
e In 1967, the Tobacco Research Council ("TRC," the
British counterpart to CTR), described the tension be-
tween industry scientists and industry executives on the is-
sue of causation in a letter sent to the general counsel of
B&W and copied to several other U.S. cigarette manufac-
turers as well as CTR and the Tobacco Institute:
The only real difficulties that we encountered arose
out of the unavoidable paradox at the centre of our
operations-namely that, on the one hand the manu-
facturers control TRC's operations and do not accept
that smoking has been proved to cause lung cancer
while, on the other hand, TRC's research programme is
based on the working hypothesis that this has been suffi-
ciently proved for research purposes. In addition, the Coun-
cil senior scientists accept that causation theory .... We
have not lyet found the best way of handling this
paradox.
* In 1969, a key scientist at Philip Morris, William L.
Dunn ("the Nicotine Kid"), in an internal memorandum
to Helmut Wakeham, acknowledged that nicotine was a
drug: "I would be more cautious in using the pharmic-
medical model-do we really want to tout cigarette smoke
228. PM 1000335619.
229. Id.
230. PM 1000335622. In contrast to Wakeham's internal notation of the "pro-
fessional approach" of the surgeon general's report, the industry circulated to the
public a pamphlet which disparaged and distorted the report's findings: "Has the
Surgeon General's Report established that smoking causes cancer and other dis-
eases? No. The report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General in 1964
failed to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between cigarette smoking and
lung cancer." TIMN 55130.
231. Liggett 298943 (emphasis added).
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as a drug? It is, of course, but there are dangerous F.D.A. impli-
cations to having such conceptualization go beyond these
walls.,
232
In 1979, a long-time scientific consultant to BAT
praised the new surgeon general's report.3 s The BAT
consultant called the 1979 report "an impressive docu-
ment" that "was on the whole sound, scientific and une-
motive. " 234 In fact, the BAT consultant blasted as "mis-
leading" a Tobacco Institute publication which attempted
to discredit the surgeon general's report.235 The consult-
ant noted that the Tobacco Institute "does not appear to
understand what causation is" and that the Tobacco Insti-
tute is "so highly selective in what material is presented
that one almost gets the false impression there is hardly
any case to answer at all.236
* In 1980, BAT also recognized the implausibility of the
industry's position on causation:
The company's position on causation is simply not
believed by the overwhelming majority of independ-
ent observers, scientists and doctors .... The industry
is unable to argue satisfactorily for its own continued
existence because all arguments eventually lead back to
the primary issue of causation and on this point our posi-
232. PM 1003289921 (emphasis added). In 1996, the Food & Drug Adminis-
trated asserted jurisdiction over tobacco products. See Regulations Restricting the
Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children
and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,398 (1996) (codified at 21 CFR pt. 801, 803, 804,
807, 820 and 897). The industry filed a lawsuit in Federal Court in North Carolina
challenging the FDA's authority to regulate cigarettes. The district court found
that jurisdiction was proper; the Fourth Circuit recently reversed this decision and
the FDA has petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See Coyne
Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
rev'd sub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153
F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), and petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 19,
1999) (No. 98-1152). See also Jill Schlick, Note, Administrative Law-The Fourth Cir-
cuit Strikes Down the FDA's Tobacco Regulations-Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.




236. Id. The "misleading" Tobacco Institute publication referenced by the
BAT consultant was titled, SMOKING AND HEALTH 1964-1979 THE CONTINUING
CoNTRovERsY. See TIMN 84430. In this publication, the Tobacco Institute stated,
inter alia, "It is time for all parties to this controversy to admit that there is much
that is unknown." TIMN at 84432A.
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237tion is unacceptable.
Thus, there was a recommendation circulated to the
highest levels of the company to break the industry's con-
spiracy of silence and admit that cigarettes cause disease
and are addictive:
We now accept that the smoking of tobacco products,
combined with other factors ... can be a cause of lung
cancer, emphysema, and other respiratory and coro-
nary diseases, many of which are fatal.
[S]moking is addictive/habituative in addition
to being an additional risk and many smokers would
like to give up the habit if they could. 2
8
This recommended approach, however, apparently lost out to
"the severe constraint of the American legal position.
9 In 1982, a long-time scientific consultant to BAT
strongly criticized BAT's insistence on publicly maintain-
ing a "controversy" on causation. Commenting on a draft
BAT smoking and health position paper, the BAT con-
sultant found the industry position on causation "short of
credibility," noting that "[it is not really true, as the Ameri-
can Tobacco Industry would like to believe, that there is a raging




* In 1984, a BAT scientist expounded on the drug quali-
ties of cigarettes:
A cigarette as a "drug" administration system for pub-
lic use has very significant advantages .... Within 10
seconds of starting to smoke, nicotine is available in
237. BAT 109881323 (emphasis added).
238. BAT 109881335 (emphasis in the original).
239. BAT 109881322-31.
240. BAT 100432194 (emphasis added). The consultant went on to write that
BAT's position paper "reads to me like a mixed marriage between traditional
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the brain .... Other "drugs" such as marijuana, am-
phetamines, and alcohol are slower and may be
mood dependent .... Thus we have an emerging
picture of a fast, highly pharmacologically effective
and cheap "drug," tobacco, which also confers flavour
241and manual and oral satisfaction to the user.
The scientist concluded that, "All we would want then is a
larger bag to carry the money to the bank."
242
To this day, with the exception of Liggett, the industry has re-
fused to publicly acknowledge that smoking causes any disease and
is addictive.
3. How Scientific Research Was Handled
To control the science and scientists within their companies,
and to thwart discovery in smoking and health cases, industry law-
yers early-on interjected themselves into the scientific process. Evi-
dence of this activity came from the industry's privilege logs-
243which listed thousands of scientific research documents -and
from the internal documents of the companies.
Minnesota presented evidence that, although the industry ad-
vertised CTR as an independent and objective scientific research
body which would investigate the health hazards of smoking and
report those results to the public, legal-not scientific-considera-
tions dominated. Lawyer control of CTR was so pervasive that the
chairman of CTR's Scientific Advisory Board wrote that "CTR should
be renamed Council for Legally Permitted Tobacco Research, CLIPT for
short."24 Similarly, a 1974 memo from Alexander Spears, a top
Lorillard Tobacco Company scientist (and now chief executive offi-
cer) to the president of the company states:
Historically, the joint industry funded smoking and health
research programs have not been selected against specific
scientific goals but rather for various purposes such as
public relations, political relations, position for litigation,
etc. Thus, it seems obvious that reviews of such programs
for scientific relevance and merit are not likely to produce
241. BAT 100503496-97 (emphasis in the original).
242. BAT 100503505.
243. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
244. CTR SF 0800031 (emphasis added).
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high ratings. In general, these programs have provided
some buffer to public and political attack of the industry,
as well as background for litigious strategy.245
Moreover, Minnesota presented evidence that the industry
lawyers impeded the objective scientific research function of CTR
by creating a division within CTR known as Special Projects. Spe-
cial Projects refers to scientific research proposals that were se-
lected for funding, not by the independent board directing CTR,
but by industry lawyers. Two types of Special Projects were funded.
The first type was research designed to create results that were
helpful to the industry's litigation and public relations interests.
These special projects were designed to be published. A second
layer of Special Projects consisted of research which might indict
smoking as a cause of illness. These projects were referred to as
lawyer special projects or special accounts; they were not intended
to be published. One of the Liggett documents over which a
claim of privilege was waived by Liggett describes the method by
which CTR Special Projects became Lawyers Special Projects:
"When we started the CTR Special Projects, the idea was that the
scientific director of CTR would review a project. If he liked it, it
was a CTR special project. If he did not like it, then it became a
lawyers' special project. 24 ' The industry claimed that the research
resulting from the lawyers special projects was privileged, thus pro-
tecting the adverse information from disclosure during litigation.
The public was not informed that CTR Special Projects re-
search was specifically targeted by tobacco industry lawyers to pro-
vide research favorable to the industry's interests (including the
industry's "public relations" purposes, which included denying or
minimizing a causal link between smoking and disease). Minnesota
245. Lorillard 01421598.
246. See Transcript of Proceedings at 62-63, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip
Morris Inc., No. Cl-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 1997). Lawyers' Special Proj-
ects were described by defense counsel at the hearing before the trial court:
And then you finally had a different kind of project, which were called
the lawyer's special projects. And these are different again. They are not
done through the grant program. They are not done through CTR's
special projects. They don't have the approval of the scientific director.
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argued that the selective disclosure of certain Special Projects re-
search presented but one more reason why claims of privilege over
any remaining Special Projects documents should fail.
The extent of the takeover by lawyers of the science is remark-
able. An April, 1978 memorandum from the chief executive office
of Lorillard complained that lawyers maintained exclusive control
over the scientific direction of the industry: "We have again 'abdi-
cated' the scientific research directional management of the Industry to the
'Lawyers' with virtually no involvement on the part of the scientific
or business management side of the business.
2
Another document presented by Minnesota during the crime-
fraud proceedings further describes the control exerted by lawyers
over scientists and scientific research. This document is a 1964 re-
port by two representatives from the TRC in England, written after
discussions with representatives of the U.S. tobacco industry:
In the U.S., by far the most important factor conditioning
action.., is the law suit situation and the danger of costly
damages being awarded against the manufacturers in a
flood of cases .... The leadership in the U.S.... lies with
the powerful policy committee of senior lawyers advising
the industry, and their policy, very understandably, in ef-
fect is "don't take any chances." It is a situation that does
not encourage constructive or bold approaches to smok-
ing and health problems, and it also means that the Policy
Committee of lawyers exercises close control over all as-
249pects of the problems.
A 1976 internal memo by a top tobacco scientist at BAT, S.J.
Green, also discusses the extent to which "legal considerations"
dominated scientific research:
The public position of tobacco companies with respect to
causal explanations of the association of cigarette smoking
and diseases is dominated by legal considerations .... By
repudiation of a causal role for cigarette smoking in gen-
eral they [the companies] hope to avoid liability in par-
ticular cases. This domination by legal consideration thus
leads the industry into a public rejection in total of any
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causal relationship between smoking and disease and puts
the industry in a peculiar position with respect to product
safety discussions, safety evaluations, collaborative re-
search etc.1
50
Indeed, legal considerations were of such paramount impor-
tance that B&W recognized, in a 1983 report on smoking and
health to one of its corporate affiliates, that "[t]he intense hostility
of the environment places a high priority on the control of state-
ments by the manufacturers on the issues. An unfortunate statement
could bring the house down."
25
1
E. The Trial Court's Prima Facie Findings of Crime-Fraud and Adoption
of the Category Review Procedure for Resolution of Privilege Claims
After consideration of the legal arguments and evidence re-
garding crime-fraud presented by both sides, the trial court issued a
detailed thirty-one page order setting forth the boundaries of theS 252
attorney-client and work product doctrine. The trial also set forth
the parameters of the crime-fraud doctrine, properly noting that
even privileged documents are discoverable upon a proper showing
of crime-fraud:
The purpose of the crime-fraud exception to documents
otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege is "to
ensure that the 'seal of secrecy' between lawyer and client
does not extend to communications from the lawyer to the
client made by the lawyer for the purpose of giving advice
for the commission of a fraud or crime." Haines v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3rd Cir. 1992) (emphasis in
the original). "The advice must relate to future illicit
conduct by the client ...." Id. This is exactly what the
Plaintiffs argue-that counsel for the tobacco industry ad-
250. BAT 109938433.
251. B&W 51206960. Similar sentiments were expressed in a March, 1977 let-
ter from a top official at B&W to a senior scientist at BAT: "I think you know that
the position in the U.S. is still focused around the existence of high risk 'wipe out'
liability; this leads to the continuing dominance of the legal attitude." BAT
110078077.
252. See Order Regarding Privilege and the Crime-Fraud Exception and Set-
ting Forth Procedures to Determine Privilege Beginning with the Liggett Docu-
ments, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
May 9, 1997) [hereinafter Privilege and Crime-Fraud Exception Order].
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vised the industry to conceal documents and research
harmful to the industry by depositing the documents with
counsel, by routing correspondence through the industry
counsel, by naming damning research projects as "special
projects" purportedly ordered by counsel, etc., to cover
potentially dangerous materials under a blanket of attor-
ney-client privilege protection, and Plaintiffs wish to tear
this blanket away.
The trial court also found that Minnesota had proved a prima
facie case of crime-fraud against the industry. The court cited to
extensive documentation in the record as support for its findings.
254
The scope of the crime-fraud findings included:
* The defendants' assurances that they "would not
knowingly distribute a dangerous ,roduct" and promises
"to solidify such an assurance ....
* The defendants' assurances "that the tobacco industry




* Defendants' "intentionally den[ying] or minimiz[ing]
known health risks. ... "257
* Defendants' use of attorneys and/or claims of privi-
lege to suppress information and documents "which ap-
pear to be scientific in nature and specifically related to
health issues."
2 5 8
e Defendants' attempts "to create doubt as to a connec-
tion between smoking and illness" and "to create doubt
that cigarette smoking causes illness."259
* Defendants' "safety-related" or "health-related" re-
search .... ,260
The trial court also condemned the industry's penchant for us-
ing privilege, when it served their purposes, to withhold unfavor-
253. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
254. See id. at 3-11.
255. Id. at 5.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 7.
258. Id. at 9.
259. Id. at 9, 10.
260. Id. at 28.
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able scientific information from the public: "This Court does not
believe that Defendants should be permitted to use in its advertis-
ing and public relations campaigns, health-related research which
supports their economic interests, and to claim privilege for re-
search which may lead to the opposite conclusion. "M
Adopting plaintiffs' legal position that scientific research on
smoking and health and the hazards of smoking cannot be with-
held as privileged, the trial court stated:
In considering whether the crime-fraud exception may
be applied to the facts of this case, this Court has made
several findings relating to statements made by the De-
fendants to the public. The Court also concludes that the
Defendants had an independent obligation to conduct re-
search into the safety of its product, and to warn the
product's consumers if the research results supported
negative conclusions. A manufacturer has a special duty,
apart from litigation, to keep abreast of the hazards posed
by its products. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 109
F.R.D. 269, 278 (E.D. Tex.), aftd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1986); see also Minnesota Civil Jury Instruction Guides, No.
117 ("You are instructed that the manufacturer is obli-
gated to keep informed of scientific knowledge and dis-
coveries in its field") and No. 119 (duty to warn). The
cigarette industry itself has recognized this duty. PM
1000334622. Plaintiffs have presented evidence, and this
Court has found, however, that the Defendants have
claimed safety-related scientific research conducted by the
Defendants has been the subject of claims of attorney-
client privilege.6 2
Notwithstanding the extensive proceedings before the trial
court, the order of May 9 also provided the industry with an addi-
tional opportunity, in proceedings before a special master, to rebut
the prima facie findings of crime-fraud. The trial court also set
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 19. In addition to finding that plaintiffs had established a prima fa-
cie case to invoke the crime-fraud exception, the trial court also found that the
Minnesota plaintiffs had met the Zolin threshold of establishing a "good faith be-
lief by a reasonable person that the materials may reveal evidence of a crime or
fraud" sufficient to warrant in camera review of the industry's documents. Id. at 30
(quoting Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 96 (3d Cir. 1992)).
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forth the procedure for determination of the industry's privilege
claims. The staggering number of documents claimed as privileged
posed a predicament for the trial court: how do you adjudicate
hundreds of thousands of privilege claims in an expeditious and ef-
ficient manner while not violating the due process rights of either
side? The industry proposed that the special master first review in
camera approximately twenty documents and make privilege de-
terminations as to this number only.26 The industry argued that it
was entitled to in camera review of every document for which privi-
lege was claimed and written findings of fact for each and every
document found not to be privileged or subject to the crime-fraud
exception.
The court adopted a different procedure whereby privilege de-
terminations would be made on a category-basis, thus eliminating
document-by-document in camera review. This ruling was made in
light of the unparalleled number of privilege claims and the prima
facie crime-fraud findings:
The extraordinary number of documents which have
been designated as privileged in this case makes it impos-
sible to conduct an in camera inspection of each docu-
ment individually to determine whether it is so closely re-
lated to plaintiffs' prima facie showing of crime-fraud that
any claim of privilege is lost. If each document for which
privilege were claimed were to be examined individually,
the trial in this matter could not commence until the next
millennium. Accordingly, this Court must fashion a proc-
ess and procedure which will balance the need for judicial
efficiency and timeliness with due process.
264. See Transcript of Proceedings at 30-31, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip
Morris Inc., No. Cl-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 1997). Counsel for Brown &
Williamson advocated the following procedure:
So we would suggest, pick a number, twenty documents, let's get them se-
lected. What then happens to those documents? I think we begin what's
basically a process of in camera review .... The special master can, with
the benefit of the documents that are selected and the arguments of
counsel and principles and all these briefs and all these decisions, make a
determination about whether these documents are privileged or not ....
Now, what happens at the very end of the road? What do we do with the
rest? As they say in the trade, we'll see.
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In order to accommodate the competing needs of the
parties in this case, it is necessary to categorize the docu-
ments subject to the claims of privilege. Such categories
would necessarily include, but not be limited to the type
of privilege claims (e.g., opinion work product, fact work
product, attorney-client, or joint defense), the subject
matter of the document, the maker of the document, and
265the recipient of the document, if any.
Before adopting the category procedure, the trial court per-
formed the following calculation:
Arbitrarily assuming that it would take only five minutes
to retrieve a document, check it against the privilege log,
read it quickly, and assign it to a 'privilege category' ... , it
would take the Special Master 750,000 minutes, or 12,500
hours, to review all the privileged documents. This is
roughly 6.25 years of a lawyer's working career. ... Thus,
an in camera review of each and every individual docu-
ment, not to mention briefing and arguments with respect
to such documents, is not feasible. An efficient procedure
by which groups of documents can be examined and dealt
with, while preserving due process, must be created and• • 1266
implemented.
The trial court also directed the parties to meet and confer to
determine the categories into which the privileged documents
should be placed. While the industry was obviously in the best posi-
tion to propose subject-matter categories for their own documents,
it refused to propose its own categories to the trial court.26 7 As a re-
sult, the trial court adopted the following subject-matter categories
proposed by plaintiffs:
CATEGORY 1: Documents found not to be privileged by
other courts.
CATEGORY 2: Documents that, on their face, show no
evidence that they were written or received by an attorney.
265. Privilege and Crime-Fraud Exception Order, supra note 252, at 11.
266. Id. at 22-23.
267. See Order with Respect to Non-Liggett Defendants' Objections to the Spe-
cial Master's Report Dated September 10, 1997, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip
Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 9 n.2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 1997).
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CATEGORY 3: Scientific research or information and
memos relating to smoking and health.
CATEGORY 4: Attorney involvement in smoking and
health, including:
(a) All documents written by, or discussing, the Com-
mittee of Counsel or the Scientific Liaison Committee or
the Research Liaison Committee.
(b) All documents relating to Special Projects (includ-
ing CTR Special Projects and Lawyers' Special Projects) or
any Special Account (including Special Account No. 4).
(c) All documents relating to 3i, LRD and/or LS, Inc.
(including documents within the current or past posses-
sion of LS, Inc.).
CATEGORY 5: Public statements and public positions
taken by defendants relating to smoking and health.
CATEGORY 6: Documents concerning ingredients, for-
mulas and design of cigarettes.
CATEGORY 7: Documents relating to persons under age
18 (or children, adolescents or young adults).
CATEGORY 8: Documents relating to advertising, mar-
keting or promotion.
CATEGORY 9: Documents relating to document destruc-
tion and discovery.
CATEGORY 10: Governmental regulation, including
warning labels.
CATEGORY 11: Documents relating to environmental
compliance, EPA regulation or patent documents (ex-
cluding materials relating to safety-related scientific issues
or nicotine).
CATEGORY 12: Documents not falling in any of the
268above categories.
The industry protested that anything less than document-by-
document adjudication of privilege violated its due process rights.
There is, however, no absolute right to document-by-document ad-
judication of privilege. Rather, the proper procedure for deter-
268. See Order Setting Forth Document Categories for Determination of Privi-
lege Claims, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at
2-3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 22, 1997).
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mining privilege is left to the discretion of the trial court." 9
Moreover, due process is a flexible standard which does not guar-
antee any particular form of procedure.270 The fundamental requi-
sites of state and federal due process consist of notice and an op-
portunity to be heard.271  With respect to attorney-client
determinations, "the fundamental concepts of due process require
that the party defending the privilege be given the opportunity to
be heard, by evidence and argument, at the hearing seeking an ex-




The situation faced by the trial court in Minnesota was
unique-there was no precedent for a litigant claiming thousands
upon thousands of scientific research documents on the health
hazards of its product as privileged. Under the trial court's cate-
gory review process, the industry would be provided repeated no-
tice and numerous opportunities to be heard, including ex parte
and in camera, regarding its claims of privilege. Moreover, other
courts had adopted similar procedures. In A. H. Robins, the federal
district court in Kansas supervising the multi-district Dalkon Shield
litigation set forth a procedure for the determination of privilege
by categories or "batches" of documents.27s In fact, in A.H. Robins,
the court found that the compelling interest of efficient admini-
stration of the courts justified reliance on legal memoranda (ap-
parently simultaneously submitted)-as opposed to an evidentiary
hearing-in the crime-fraud determination.
Since the Minnesota decision, several other courts have found
269. See In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980). "The proper pro-
cedure by which to determine the existence of the privilege is left to the trial
court." Id.; see also Thermorama, Inc. v. Shiller, 271 Minn. 79, 85, 135 N.W.2d 43,
47 (1965) (indicating that, with pre-trial matters, "[m]uch must be left to the ex-
ercise of a sound judicial discretion by the trial court").
270. See Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 1992). "The require-
ments of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands." Id.; see also Humenansky v. Minnesota Bd. of Med.
Examiners, 525 N.W.2d 559, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ("[D]ue process is a flexi-
ble concept and the form of procedural protection varies according to the particu-
lar situation."); In reA.H. Robins Co., Inc., 107 F.R.D. 2, 6 (D. Kan. 1985) ("The
nature of the specific process due in a given instance ... varies according to the
factual circumstances of the case and the nature of the interests involved.").
271. See Omdahl v. Hadler, 459 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); A.H.
Robins, 107 F.R.D. at 6.
272. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992).
273. See A.H. Robins, 107 F.R.D. at 15; see also In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 97
F.R.D. 481, 484-85 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (setting forth a procedure in which the court
would "spot check" summaries of privileged documents submitted by defendant).
274. SeeA.H. Robins, 170 F.R.D. at 6, 15.
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that a document-by-document adjudication is not always required.
A Fourth Circuit judge in In re American Honda Motor Co.,27 5 denied
a motion for a stay from a district court order requiring the pro-
duction, under the crime-fraud exception, of allegedly privileged
documents. The judge rejected petitioners' contention that the
district court was required to review each and every document:
"Honda's assertion that the district court was required to review
each allegedly privileged communication in camera before order-
ing disclosure is without merit."2 76
Similarly, in Sealed Appellees v. Sealed Appellants, 77 the Fifth Cir-
cuit defined the required process to determine the discoverability
of allegedly opinion work product communications:
The preferable practice in factual patterns, such as here,
is for the court to examine a sufficient number of the contested
documents to ensure the informed protection of the privilege ....
That examination can be conducted by the court or a spe-
cial master or magistrate judge as the district court may
278choose.
In Minnesota, the industry waited until the eve of trial to seek
its first appellate review of the category procedures set by the trial
court for privilege determination. The Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals, however, held that the challenge to the categorical review
process was untimely279 and that the industry could not establish
that "the procedures they seek would have yielded any greater pro-
tection. 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court later denied the indus-
try's getition for discretionary review of the court of appeal's deci-
sion.
275. See In re American Honda Motor Co., No. 98-1415 (4th Cir. Mar. 24,
1998).
276. Id. at 6.
277. 112 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1997).
278. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
279. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C5-97-2349 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 13, 1998). "To the extent that petitioners are challenging the employ-
ment of categories rather than a line-by-line review of every document, the peti-
tion is untimely." Id.
280. Id.
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F. Privilege Proceedings Related to the Liggett Documents
The first group of documents addressed by the special master
were the approximately two thousand documents for which Lig-
gett-as part of its settlement with the State of Minnesota-had
waived any claim of privilege. In conjunction with the Liggett
documents, the industry was also given an additional opportunity,
before the special master, to rebut the prima facie crime-fraud find-
ings of the trial court in the order of May 9, 1997.
The special master issued a series of orders further illuminat-
ing the category review procedure. For instance, the special master
stated that "determination of privilege shall be based upon a thor-
ough working knowledge of the documents and the characteristics
therein that define privilege status within each classification."
2 82
The special master also stated his intention to "review a consider-
able number of documents from each classification, 28 ' and granted
the industry unlimited rights to present written submissions and
live witnesses at an evidentiary hearing.
84
In July, 1997, the special master conducted a three-day eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether: (1) the industry had success-
fully rebutted the crime-fraud findings, and (2) the privilege status
of the Liggett documents. While the industry was given an unre-
stricted right to bring live witnesses to testify, including ex parte,
only one witness was called to testify regarding only two Liggett
documents. Counsel for the plaintiffs were also excluded from the




On September 10, 1997, the special master issued a report and
recommendation regarding the Liggett documents, finding nu-
merous documents were either not privileged in the first instance
2816or discoverable under the crime-fraud exception. Holding plain-
282. First Order Establishing Procedures for the Review of Documents Subject
to Privilege Claims, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565,
slip op. at 4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 16, 1997).
283. Id.
284. See id. at 6-7.
285. The industry also submitted ninety exhibits to the special master ex parte
during the course of the hearings. The industry was afforded virtually unlimited
opportunity for ex parte submissions. Because it undermines the basic foundation
of an adversary system of jurisprudence, the use of ex parte proceedings is disfa-
vored. See RicE, supra note 128, § 11.15.
286. See Report of the Special Master: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendations, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565
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tiffs to a "preponderance of the evidence " ' s7 standard on crime-
fraud, the special master concluded that the industry had failed to
rebut (with one small exception) the crime-fraud findings as set
forth in the trial court's order of May 9, 1997.288 The special master
rejected the industry's argument that Minnesota was required to
prove every element of a cause of action for fraud.28 9 The special
master relied, in part, on the fact that under the consumer protec-
tion statutes plead by Minnesota in its complaint, no proof of reli-
ance was requtred.
The special master's report also included detailed factual find-
ings. For example, the special master found that:
e ".... CTR was meant to serve primarily a public rela-
tions function and... CTR scientific research was of little
value in addressing issues relating to the causal link be-
tween smoking and health."21
* CTR Special Projects were selected by tobacco indus-
try counsel "on the basis of utility in litigation, congres-
sional testimony, administrative proceedings and for pub-
lic relations purposes .... [The projects were selected
for their favorable prospects." 
2
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Special Master's Report].
287. See id. at 39. The special master set forth his inquiry in the crime-fraud
determination as follows:
Am I satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence offered by both
plaintiffs and defendants that the defendants were engaged in criminal
or fraudulent conduct? Included within "criminal or fraudulent con-
duct" are a failure to conduct appropriate research into the safety of
their products and failure to warn their products' consumers if the re-
search supported negative conclusions.
Second, has it been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the involvement of defendants' attorneys was in furtherance
of the conduct or was closely related to it?
Id. "Preponderance of the evidence" is a higher standard of proof than required
by the majority of courts for discovery of documents pursuant to the crime-fraud
exception. See supra notes 161 and 166 and accompanying text (citing cases that
require only a "probable cause" or "prima facie" standard showing of crime or
fraud).
288. See id. at 42.
289. See id. at 38.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 8.
292. Id. at 41.
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e "Plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence show-
ing involvement in scientific research and other scientific
matters by attorneys for the tobacco industry, and that in-
dustry attorneys were a driving force behind the direction
of and the suppression of scientific research. "
* "It appears that one method by which attorneys may
have controlled research is through maneuvers intended
to 'create' privileges."
2 94
* "Notwithstanding these internal documents, the in-
dustry's public relations strategy has been to deny causa-
tion and to keep the controversy alive."
29 5
* "Over the years, tobacco industry spokespersons made
many comments clearly intended to create doubt as to a
connection between smoking and illness."
296
* "These types of repeated statements by the tobacco
industry denying or diminishing the health effects of
smoking also were published in Minnesota.",
2 7
& The industry did not acknowledge "that there was a
statistical association between smoking and disease except
as part of a denial of causation." Industry's public state-
ments "are plainly intended to create doubt as to causa-
tion, rather than function as an 'admission.'"28
* "I also conclude that this attorney-directed control of
an industry's research does, in fact, fall within the con-
fines of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege."
299
The special master concluded that the industry had not sus-
tained its burden of proving privilege with respect to the Liggett
documents in four of the subject-matter categories.00 In addition,
293. Id. at 11.
294. Id. at 13.
295. Id. at 16.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 18.
298. Id. at 34.
299. Id. at 42. The limited area which the special master carved out of the
crime-fraud findings relates to one aspect of CTR: grant research approved by the
CTR Scientific Advisory Board ("SAB"). See id. at 41.
300. The special master concluded that the industry had not sustained its bur-
den of proving privilege for documents in categories 1, 3, 5 and 7. With respect to
Category 1-documents found not privileged by other courts-the special master
reviewed all 292 documents in this category, finding that they were not privileged
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the special master found that the crime-fraud exception applied to
three categories.30' Thus, the special master recommended pro-
duction of 834 documents-approximately thirty percent of the to-
tal Liggett documents claimed as privileged.
On December 16, 1997, the trial court adopted (with minor
modification) the special master's recommendation that 834 out of
approximately 2,000 Liggett documents were not privileged in the
first instance or, even if privileged, were discoverable under the
302crime-fraud exception. The court also concluded that industry
lawyers had abused the privilege process and that "reckless or will-
ful disregard" of court orders was evident.303 The trial court also
found that the industry's abuse of the ex parte process had "ham-
pered Plaintiffs in their response to the Non-Liggett Defendants'
arguments before the Special Master and interfered with Plaintiffs'
due process rights." 304 The trial court asked rhetorically whether
the industry had claimed privilege over clearly non-privileged ma-
terial "simply to create more of a 'haystack' in which to hide their
'needles'." °0 Thus, under Rules 11, 16.02, 26.07 and 37.02 of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court found that an
because they "reflect[ed] attorneys selecting and directing research projects" and
"represent[ed] information as to the 'corporate knowledge' of the defendants at
relevant times... Id. at 43. The special master noted that "[i]f corporate re-
search directors had selected and directed research on safety issues, the docu-
ments generated during the decision-making process would have been discover-
able." Id. Category 3-scientific research-was found not privileged because the
documents "do not demonstrate a process of a client seeking advice or an attorney
providing advice." Id. at 45. Category 5-public statements-was found not privi-
leged on the same grounds. See id. at 48-49. The special master's review of docu-
ments in Category 7-youth-revealed that the industry was claiming privilege
over mere transmittal letters, not attorney communications. See id. at 50.
301. The crime-fraud exception was found to apply to Categories 1, 3 and 4b.
Documents in Category 1 were subject to disclosure under the crime-fraud excep-
tion because "they demonstrate the actual involvement of the attorneys for the de-
fendant companies in the selection, funding, and funding continuation for CTR
special projects and because these documents provide relevant evidence of the re-
sponse by the defendants to allegations from external sources to the effect that the
defendants' products were unsafe." Id. at 43. Documents in Category 3 "re-
flect[ed] the involvement of the Liggett attorneys in the monitoring of that com-
pany's research function." Id. at 45. A similar conclusion was reached with respect
to category 4b-special projects documents. See id. at 47.
302. See Order With Respect to Non-Liggett Defendants' Objections to the
Special Master's Report Dated September 10, 1997, State ex rel. Humphrey v.
Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 1997).
303. Id. at 15.
304. Id. at 17.
305. Id. at 19.
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appropriate sanction included strikin the industry's claims of
privilege on the 834 Liggett documents. 
6
Almost simultaneously with the trial court's December order,
the cigarette companies, in response to a congressional subpoena,
submitted the Liggett documents to United States Representative
Thomas Bliley. Rep. Bliley then published most of the documents
on the Internet for the whole world to see.307
G. Privilege Proceedings Related to the Non-Liggett Documents
Beginning in the fall of 1997, the special master shifted focus
to the non-Liggett defendants' claims of privilege over more than
230,000 documents. The special master conducted four days of
evidentiary hearings in October, 1997, to hear argument regarding
the industry's claims of privilege over the 230,000 documents. Dur-
ing those hearings, the industry again was given an unrestricted
right to present argument ex parte and call live witnesses to tes-
• 308tlfy. The special master provided the industry with advance no-
tice of each document he had randomly selected for in camera re-
view, thus affording the defendants an opportunity to present
individualized argument and evidence for each of these docu-
309ments.
306. There are a variety of sanctions available to a district court for discovery
abuses, including the striking of claims. See Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130,
145 (Minn. 1990) (citing "a variety of sanctions" available to a court, including "an
order precluding the litigation of certain claims or defenses"); see also MINN. R.
Civ. P. 37.02 (allowing the court to "make such orders... as are just", including
"an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support ... designated claims
or defenses"); EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 138, at 60 (stating that waiver of the
attorney-client privilege "follows from any conduct by the client that would make it
unfair for him thereafter to assert the privilege"); Applied Sys., Inc. v. Northern
Ins. Co., No. 97-C-1565, 1997 WL 639235, at 2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 1997) (stating that
abuse of process for determining privilege justifies finding that privilege is
waived).
307. The documents can be found at the following Internet site:
<http://www.house.gov/commerce/TobaccoDocs/documents.html>.
308. See Fifth Order Establishing Procedures for the Review of Documents Sub-
ject to Privilege Claims 1 6, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-
8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Fifth Order]. The industry,
however, failed to present a single witness during the four days of hearings to sup-
port its claims of privilege.. Instead, the industry relied on lengthy oral presenta-
tions by counsel.
309. See id. 3, 10. Once the industry learned of the documents randomly
selected for in camera review by the special master, the industry lawyers promptly
withdrew many of their claims of privilege over those documents. Minnesota's
counsel argued that this action by industry counsel was intentionally designed to
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The industry was also granted yet another opportunity to rebut
the prima facie crime-fraud findings made earlier. by Judge Fitz-
patrick and during the Liggett proceedings. The industry submit-
ted more than one thousand pages of briefs and fifty boxes of sup-
porting material-much of it ex parte-to attempt to rebut these
findings.
The primary thrust of Minnesota's position continued to be
that the industry was improperly shielding scientific information on
the hazards of smoking. For example, Minnesota had calculated
that RJR was claiming privilege over more than 2,500 scientific re-
search reports authored by its long-time scientist Dr. Frank Colby.
At the privilege hearings, RJR maintained that these reports were
authored by Dr. Colby in his capacity as a consultant to the legal
department. Dr. Colby's deposition, however, contradicted RJR's
position and confirmed Minnesota's suspicion that the reports were
merely filtered through lawyers so that RJR could later claim privi-
lege. Minnesota presented the special master with the following
testimony from Dr. Colby's deposition:
Q. And you would also agree with me, would you not,
that when you conducted your analyses of this literature
after 1964, that your analysis was really done for the entire
company of R.J. Reynolds, not just for the lawyers; cor-
rect?
A. It was channeled through the lawyers. The smoking and
health analysis was channeled through the lawyers mostly.
skew the random selection process and that consideration of these documents in
camera should proceed. The special master agreed, finding that if the documents
were removed from consideration, "the integrity of the entire procedure could be
undermined." Report of Special Master: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendations Regarding Non-Liggett Privilege Claims 1 207, State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 1998) [here-
inafter Non-Liggett Report]. In addition, such behavior raised "concern[] that
defendants have over-designated documents as privileged." Id. In addition to the
documents randomly selected by the special master, the Fifth Order provided that
Minnesota was allowed to select privileged documents for "particularized discus-
sion" in the briefs or at the hearing. Fifth Order, supra note 308, 1 10. Pursuant
to this provision, Minnesota's counsel hand-selected approximately 400 additional
documents for review within subject-matter Category 1.
310. Transcript of Deposition of Dr. Frank Colby, vol. 2 at 243, State ex rel.
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1. Additional Evidence of Crime-Fraud
Minnesota also presented more evidence of crime-fraud con-
duct in two particular areas: nicotine addiction/manipulation and
suppression of in-house smoking and health research, including
biological research.
a. Nicotine Addiction and Manipulation
The evidence offered regarding nicotine addiction and ma-
nipulation included the industry's public statements concerning
addiction, as well as its internal knowledge of the properties of•311
nicotine and its conduct with respect to the design of cigarettes.
To this day in its public statements, the industry has repeatedly de-
nied that cigarettes and/or nicotine are addictive and has mini-
mized the difficulties of quitting smoking. For example, in 1988
after the surgeon general declared nicotine was addictive,312 the
Tobacco Institute issued the following press release:
Claims that cigarettes are addictive contradict common
sense .... The claim that cigarette smoking causes physi-
cal dependence is simply an unproven attempt to find
some way to differentiate smoking from other behav-
iors .... The claims that smokers are "addicts" defy com-
mon sense and contradict the fact that people quit smok-
311. The industry claimed before the special master that Minnesota's submis-
sion of additional evidence of crime-fraud was unfair. Counsel for Philip Morris
stated: "I submit not General Giap and Ho Chi Minh could have conceived a bet-
ter guerilla strategy for attacking us on other fronts and confounding their enemy
.... Transcript of Hearing at 26, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., C1-
94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 15, 1997). The special master rejected defendants'
characterization, finding that "[p]ursuant to the Fifth Order Establishing Proce-
dures, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce additional evidence of crime-fraud."
Non-Liggett Report, supra note 309, 171 (citing Fifth Order, supra note 308, at
4).
312. The 1988 surgeon general's report states that:
1. Cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting.
2. Nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction.
3. The pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine tobacco
addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to drugs such as
heroin and cocaine.
SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION 9 (1988).
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ing every day. 3
Notwithstanding the public denials, Minnesota presented evi-
dence that the industry has long recognized internally that nicotine
is an addictive drug and that cigarettes are drug delivery or nico-
tine delivery devices:
* A report of discussions with industry research direc-
tors in the 1950s-as the industry prepared to publish the
Frank Statement-recorded among their conclusions
"[I]t's fortunate for us that cigarettes are a habit they
can't break."
3 14
* A 1961 document by Sir Charles Ellis, a top BAT sci-
entist, stated, "smokers are nicotine addicts."1 5
* A 1972 document by Philip Morris' Dunn stated that
the majority of conferees at a recent CTR conference "ac-
cept the proposition that nicotine is the active constituent
of cigarette smoke. Without nicotine, the argument goes,
there would be no smoking."316 Dunn continued: "The
cigarette should be conceived not as a product but as a
package. The product is nicotine .... Think of the ciga-
rette pack as a storage container for a day's supply of nico-
tine .... Think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose
unit of nicotine."
317
e A 1972 document by Claude Teague, an RJR senior
scientist, stated that "the tobacco industry may be thought
of as being a specialized, highly ritualized and stylized
segment of the pharmaceutical industry. Tobacco prod-
ucts, uniquely, contain and deliver nicotine, a potent drug
with a variety of physiological effects."
318
e A 1978 B&W document stated "[v]ery few consumers
are aware of the effects of nicotine, i.e., its addictive na-
ture and that nicotine is a poison. "319
313. TI 0019963. The Tobacco Institute criticized the surgeon general's decla-
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e A 1979 document by BAT research executive L.C.F.B.
Blackman considered the hypothesis that "high profits...
associated with the tobacco industry are directly related to
the fact that the customer is dependent upon the prod-
uct.
, 320
* A 1980 BAT document stated that "B.A.T. should
learn to look at itself as a drug company rather than as a
tobacco company.,,321
* A 1980 document by Philip Morris scientist Osdene
stated, "the thing we sell most is nicotine."
3 2 2
* A 1983 document by RJR scientist Teague stated that
"[i]n essence, a cigarette is a system for delivery of nico-
tine to the smoker in attractive, useful form."
3 23
e A 1991 RJR report stated, "We are basically in the
nicotine business.
There also was extensive evidence presented that the industry
intentionally controls and manipulates the level and form of nico-
tine in the commercial cigarette to ensure continued addiction.
One process for secretly manipulating nicotine highlighted in the
privilege proceeding involved manipulating the form of nicotine in
cigarettes by controlling the pH of cigarette smoke through the use
of ammonia compounds. The introduction of ammonia or ammo-
nia compounds into the cigarette manufacturing process raises the
pH of tobacco.325 As the pH rises, the tobacco smoke becomes
more "basic" and results in an increase in the amount of "free"
nicotine, also known as "free base" nicotine (as opposed to• • 326
"bound" nicotine). Free nicotine is more volatile and physiologi-
cally active than bound nicotine. As one RJR document explained:
In essence, a cigarette is a system for delivery of nicotine
to the smoker in attractive, useful form. At "normal"
smoke pH, at or below about 6.0, essentially all of the






325. See RJR 511223468; RJR 500606141.
326. See RJR 511223466; LOR 00776239.
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stances, hence is non-volatile and relatively slowly ab-
sorbed by the smoker. As the smoke pH increases above
about 6.0, an increasing proportion of the total smoke
nicotine occurs in "free" form, which is volatile, rapidly
absorbed by the smoker, and believed to be instantly per-
ceived as nicotine "kick.
3 2 7
Minnesota presented evidence demonstrating that Philip Mor-
ris was the first tobacco manufacturer to use the ammonia process
in the United States, beginning in 1964 or 1965, on the heels of the
first surgeon general's report. At the time, Philip Morris ranked
far behind RJR in domestic cigarette sales. Simultaneously with the
use of ammonia in its cigarettes, sales of Philip Morris products be-
gan to rise dramatically. While RJR and the rest of the tobacco in-
dustry soon learned the reasons behind the success of Marlboro,
the public-and smokers-were not informed. RJR soon moved its
cigarette design in the same direction as Philip Morris. In 1973,
RJR discussed using pH manipulation "to assure RJR a larger seg-
ment of the youth market."330 Eventually, the use of ammonia was
the norm of the industry. As B&W reported in a 1989 document,
"[A]l1 U.S. manufacturers except Liggett use some form of AT
[ammonia technology] on some cigarettes products."
33
Minnesota also presented evidence of lawyer involvement in
nicotine addiction and manipulation. The industry had logged as
privileged hundreds of documents written by scientists regarding
nicotine and addiction. The industry recognized that the issues of
nicotine addiction were potentially explosive in smoking and
327. RJR 511223466. BAT scientists also understood that "free base nicotine is
the most chemically and physiologically active form because it is most rapidly ab-
sorbed." BAT 500104408.
328. See RJR 500991002.
329. See RJR 511223463. In 1973, RJR conducted an extensive study of the de-
sign of Philip Morris Marlboro cigarettes in attempt to discover the reason for its
competitor's sharp increase in sales. RJR 511223465. A "secret" RJR report dis-
closed that the pH of Marlboro was consistently and significantly higher than
RJR's brands and, accordingly, Marlboro contained more free nicotine and "would
be expected to show more instantaneous nicotine 'kick' than our brands." RJR
511223466. RJR also found that other well-selling brands-for example B&W's
Kool-also had increased smoke pH and increased amounts of "free nicotine." Id.
RJR concluded that the high smoke pH attained by Philip Morris and B&W was
"deliberate and controlled." RJR 511223465.
330. RJR 501166152.
331. B&W 508104016. Minnesota presented evidence that Liggett later also
began to use ammonia technology. See LG 2018563.
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* .. 332health litigation.
Minnesota argued that the evidence concerning nicotine and
addiction was closely-related to the trial court's earlier crime-fraud
findings, since nicotine was clearly related to the health and safety
issues in the case, i.e., nicotine in cigarettes makes it more difficult
for people to quit smoking. The industry countered by arguing
that Minnesota's counsel had "cherry-picked" industry documents,
picking only incriminating evidence while ignoring exculpatory
documents. Noting the breadth and quality of the evidence pre-
sented by Minnesota, the special master found that the industry did
not "dispute[] the content of these documents," nor "present evi-
dence from their own internal files to support their allegation that
"33plaintiffs' selection is unrepresentative ....
b. Suppression of Research
During the Liggett round of privilege hearings, the special
master found that there was no evidence that "the defendant com-
panies conducted significant independent research, i.e., that which
was notjointly sponsored through CTR. 334 The special master also
concluded: "[T] he failure on the part of defendants individually to
investigate the safety of their product, coupled with their ongoing
assurances that causation of illnesses was unproved and speculative,
necessarily implicates the holding of Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469
N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) .... "35 This issue took on
even greater significance during the non-Liggett privilege proceed-
ings.
Minnesota presented documents and testimony showing that,
for many years, the U.S. manufacturing defendants failed to per-
form in-house smoking and health research, including biological
research.36 There was also evidence that the failure of the domes-
332. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (recognizing that addiction is
the "most potent weapon a prosecuting attorney can have in a lung can-
cer/cigarette case.").
333. Non-Liggett Report, supra note 309, 1 268.
334. Special Master's Report, supra note 286, 1 140.
335. Id. 1 146.
336. Biological research is the type of research a company would undertake to
examine the safety of its products with respect to humans. WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGATE DICTIONARY 152 (1990). Minnesota presented evidence that Brown &
Williamson and American never conducted any in-house biological research or re-
search related to the health effects of tobacco. See Non-Liggett Report, supra note
309, 11 106-07, 146-47. RJR performed in-biological testing for only three years,
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tic tobacco manufacturers to conduct in-house smoking and health
research was, in part, the result of a conspiracy. For example,
documents produced in Minnesota described how RJR's biological
research division, also known as the "mouse house," was shut down
because of this industry agreement. The mouse house, opened by
RJR in 1967, was a sophisticated in-house lab for conducting bio-
logical research-including inhalation tests-on animals, including
rats, rabbits, mice and gerbils. Preliminary results from mouse in-
halation tests in the RJR mouse house demonstrated "[a] diffuse,
marked emphysema throughout the lungs .... ,3 In 1970, RJR
abruptly shut down the mouse house and fired twenty-six scien-
tists. RJR argued during the privilege proceedings that the
mouse house was closed for business reasons. A contemporaneous
memorandum from the files of BAT, however, explains that the
shutdown was related to the industry's "tacit agreement between
the heads of the US companies" not to conduct "in-house biologi-
cal research.""" After learning that RJR was conducting biological
studies, Philip Morris president Cullman lodged a complaint with
RJR president Galloway.3' The result of this conversation was a
"sudden reorganization at Reynolds, resulting in the closure of the
biological section."
3 4 1
Philip Morris scientists also complained about the restrictions
imposed by the industry agreement not to conduct in-house bio-
logical research. In 1964, Helmut Wakeham-a senior Philip Mor-
ris scientist-wrote that the "[c]ompetitive pressures suggest a
breakup of the common front approach of the industry through TI
and TIRC."342 Wakeham also recommended that "It]he industry
1967-1970. See id. 1114. A "large proportion" of Lorillard's in-house research was
related to product development, not the health effects of smoking or nicotine. Id.
144.
337. RJR 515596269. A 1969 Philip Morris document reveals that this informa-
tion was shared by RJR with its competitor, Philip Morris: "I met Dr. Price from
R.J. Reynolds at the CTR-USA meeting of December 11 and 12, 1969. He men-
tioned doing chronic cigarette smoke exposure studies with rats. The animals re-
ceived up to 500 cigarettes and emphysema was produced." PM 1001882748 (emphasis
added).
338. See RJR 503950747. RJR commissioned a third-party report on the closing
of the mouse house, known as the Brubaker Report. See RJR 515597278-468. This




342. PM 1000335616-17. Wakeham also confirmed in his deposition that there
was an agreement not to conduct in-house smoking and health research:
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should abandon its past reticence with respect to medical re-
search," noting that "failure to do such research could give rise to
negligence charges."
3 43
2. Special Master's Findings
After nearly four months of consideration, the special master
issued a 144-page report recommending that approximately 39,000
of the withheld documents were not privileged in the first instance
or were discoverable under the crime-fraud exception to privi-
lege." The report was issued several weeks after trial had com-
menced in St. Paul, Minnesota. The categories of documents or-
dered produced related predominately to scientific research and
the industry's public statements on the health hazards of ciga-
345
rettes.
Q. What's the type of research that you understood that there was an
understanding that the cigarette companies would not be doing in-
house?
A. Studying a relationship which might exist between smoking and dis-
eases such as were tabulated in the Surgeon General's report.
Transcript of Deposition of Helmut R.R. Wakeham, vol. 1 at 91, State ex rel. Hum-
phrey v. Philip Morris Inc., C1-94-8564 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 29, 1997) [hereinafter
Wakeham Deposition].
343. PM 1000335622. As of 1968, Philip Morris was still not conducting in-
house biological research. See Wakeham Deposition, supra note 342, at 85. "We
were-we were doing tests on some animals, again related to the irritation prob-
lem, not regarding-not relating to cancer or anything else of that nature. Id. at 86
(emphasis added). Minnesota presented evidence that Philip Morris turned to
Europe, to a facility it purchased in Cologne known as INBIFO, for smoking and
health research. See supra note 73 for discussion of INBIFO research.
344. See Non-Liggett Report, supra note 309.
345. The special master ordered production of four (out of fourteen) Catego-
ries of documents: Categories I, III, IVb and V. The special master found that
documents in Category I-documents other courts had found discoverable
and/or documents specifically selected by Minnesota's counsel-supported the
inference that "attorneys manipulated or attempted to manipulate industry sci-
ence," and that each of the documents "goes directly to the control or suppression
of research, and the creation of privilege shields to conceal possession of danger-
ous information." See id. 315, 316. Documents in Category III-scientific re-
search-were ordered produced because they demonstrated "what the Defendants
knew and when they knew it." Id. 1 334. For Category 4b documents-special
projects-the special master found that his earlier finding that the public was de-
ceived by CTR Special Projects was unrebutted. Id. 11 339-342. Category V
documents were discoverable because "they detail formulation of public state-
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Once again, the special master's report included detailed find-
ings of fact. On the evidence of suppression of research presented
by Minnesota, the special master concluded:
* The inference of a "gentleman's agreement" has been
fairly presented and not rebutted.
3
4
e This failure to conduct in-house biological research
was not restricted to one tobacco company. ... [T]his
failure was industry-wide. I find this fact significant, as the
members of this industry have portrayed the companies as
being fiercely competitive. 347
e Plaintiffs have established to a degree of probability
that Defendants collectively agreed not to conduct, or to
eliminate or reduce, scientific research which related to
issues of smoking and health. This evidence has not been
rebutted.4
On nicotine and addiction, the special master concluded that
"there are a large number of documents relating to addiction and
nicotine manipulation for which the tobacco companies are assert-
ing privilege. Furthermore, the special master found evidence
that the "tobacco industry intentionally maintains nicotine at cer-
tain levels because the defendants [tobacco companies] have long
been aware that there is an optimum dose of nicotine needed for
its pharmacological and addictive qualities to have their intended
effect. "35 The special master found that the evidence presented
"concerning nicotine and addiction" was closely related to the
Court's May 9 crime-fraud findings relating to the industry's assur-
ances that they "would not knowingly distribute a dangerous prod-
uct," the industry's assurances "that the tobacco industry was com-
mitted to providing safe products" and the industry's "use of
attorneys and/or claims of privilege to suppress information and
documents 'which appear to be scientific in nature and specifically,,,.351
related to health issues. Accordingly, the special master con-
cluded that "further inquiry must be permitted and that plaintiffs
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in this case must be permitted to inspect documents withheld on
claims of privilege which relate [to] nicotine addiction and ma-
nipulation (even if such documents are privileged in the first in-
stance) .52
On lawyer involvement in scientific research, the special mas-
ter concluded:
o Plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence showing
involvement in scientific research ahd other scientific
matters by attorneys for the tobacco industry, and that in-
dustry attorneys were a driving force behind the direction
of and the suppression of scientific research .
o I find that defendants' claims of privilege are overly-
broad. Defendants have asserted privilege over thousands of
communications that constitute or concern scientific research. As
Judge Fitzpatrick concluded, however, defendants had an
independent obligation to conduct research into the
safety of their products, and to warn consumers if the re-
search results supported negative conclusions.
o I specifically find that defendants have asserted claims
of privilege over information generated by counsel acting
in scientific, administrative or public relations capacities,
but not in a legal capacity. That information is not privi-
leged.355
The special master also found that Minnesota had demon-
strated "substantial need" for scientific research "designated by de-
fendants as fact work product," because "defendants ...contest
that smoking causes disease and nicotine is addictive, yet seek to
place certain research and/or scientific analysis that may provide
otherwise beyond discovery."3 56 The special master found that "se-
lectively" claiming such research as privileged while producing
other types of research, "strengthened" plaintiffs' showing of sub-
stantial need.357
The trial court, after reviewing documents itself and allowing
352. Id. 1 306.
353. Id. 1 36.
354. Id. 1 279 (emphasis added).
355. Id. 1281.
356. Id. 1 282.
357. Id. 1 283-85.
[Vol. 25
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the parties to be heard, adopted the special master's recommenda-
tions.3 58 The trial court also described a "pattern of abuse" by the
industry lawyers before the special master, including "in numerous
instances claim[ing] privilege where none is due and blatantly
abus[ing] the categorization process." 359 The trial court held that
the "intentional and repeated misuse of claims of privilege is intol-
erable in a court of law, and an appropriate sanction for such abuse
is release of all documents for which privilege is improperly
claimed.'36 The trial court also found that the special master had
properly applied the Minnesota law of privilege and the crime-
fraud exception, and that the industry had been afforded full due361
process. The trial court found that "a review less cautious and
conservative than our Special Master" might have recommended
even further disclosures.
The industry sought appellate review-for the second time--of
the categorical review process established by the trial court in its
order of May 9. On March 17, 1998, the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals denied the industry's petitions for writs of prohibition and
mandamus, finding that its challenge to the categorical review pro-
cess employed by the trial court over the past ten months was un-
timely. 3 3 The court of appeals found that the trial court had not
358. See Order with Respect to Non-Liggett Defendants' Objections to the Spe-
cial Master's Report Dated February 10, 1998, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip
Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 7, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter Order Respecting Objection's to Special Master].
359. Id. at 5, 15. Other courts also have found that the industry has abused the
judicial process. In Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., after examination of
RJR's claims of privilege over a much smaller grouping of documents, the federal
magistrate found that "[t]here are inconsistencies in the various submissions by
RJR .... " 170 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Kan. 1997). On RJR's motion for re-
consideration, the magistrate held that "the representations of counsel.., were
clearly contrary to any reasonable application of the attorney-client privilege or
work product doctrine." Burton, on reconsideration in part, 175 F.R.D. 321, 328 (D.
Kan. 1997). The special master in Butler v. Philip Morris Inc. found a few docu-
ments during in camera review "which might cause particular attorneys, not in-
volved in the instant case, to face some ethic charges regarding candor with the
Court" and which "may bring requests for sanctions for delay in production in ac-
cordance with the rules." Butler v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 94-5-53, at 14 (Miss. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 21, 1997).
360. See Order Respecting Objection's to Special Master, supra note 358, at 15-
16.
361. See id. at 3.
362. Id. at 16.
363. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., Nos. CX-98-414, CX-98-
431, slip op. at 2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1998).
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exceeded its legitimate powers, and that the industry had failed to
show that the documents ordered produced were clearly not discov-
erable.3 64 Thus, the standard for extraordinary relief was not satis-
fied. 65 The court of appeals also found that the industry's oppor-
tunity to assert its claims was not "limited or abridged in any
significant way," that the industry failed to show that the trial court
had applied the wrong legal standard or that the detailed findings
of the special master were inadequate support for the trial court's
order.366 The court of appeals delayed its order for two days to af-
ford the industry an opportunity to seek further relief, including a
stay, from the Minnesota Supreme Court.
On March 18, 1998, the industry filed a motion for an emer-
gency stay in the Minnesota Supreme Court together with two peti-
tions for review of the court of appeals' March 17, 1998 decision.
On March 19, 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted the
367temporary stay pending final disposition of the two petitions. On
March 27, 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied both peti-
tions, finding that the categorical review process adopted by the
trial court "recognized the virtually unprecedented dimension of discovery
and assertion of privilege involved in this case"368 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court also found that the "extraordinary relief' sought by
the industry-line-by-line review of each document-was "an im-
possibility. "3  Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that,
by denying the request for discretionary review of a discovery order,
they were not "address [ing] or decid [ing] the propriety of the pro-. • ,370
cess established by the trial court. The court also stayed its order
until 5:00 p.m. Wednesday, April 1, 1998.
The industry then sought a stay from Justice Thomas of the
United States Supreme Court. This request was denied on April 2,
1998,371 but a temporary stay was put in effect until April 6 so that
the industry could seek relief from another Justice. The industry
then petitioned Justice Scalia, who referred the matter to the entire
364. See id. (emphasis in original).
365. See id.
366. Id. at 3.
367. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., Nos. CX-98-414, CX-98-
431, 1998 WL 154543 (Minn. Mar. 27, 1998).
368. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
369. Id.
370. Id.
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Court. On the morning of April 6, the application for stay was
denied by the Court and the documents were soon thereafter pro-
duced to Minnesota's counsel. 73
V. REVELATIONS FROM THE "PRIVILEGED" DOCUMENTS
PRODUCED IN MINNESOTA
When tens of thousands of the privileged documents were fi-
nally produced, the documents confirmed plaintiffs' counsels'
long-standing belief that documents had been improperly withheld
on claims of privilege. The documents also add significantly to our
understanding of the tobacco industry and should be studied for
years to come by legal scholars, historians, and ethicists. Many of
the withheld documents were purely scientific, not legal, in nature.
Many documents verified-and added new detail to the under-
standing of-the ubiquitous dominance of tobacco industry lawyers
over smoking and health issues, including scientific research. Many
documents contain extraordinary details about the concealment-
and destruction-of evidence.
An example of withheld documents which were purely scien-
tific in nature is a series of reports written by Alan Rodgman, a sci-
entist at RJR. Beginning in the 1950s, Rodgman began to write re-
ports on the health hazards of smoking. These reports are a
detailed compendium on the health hazards of smoking. These
reports do not contain legal analysis or legal advice. Yet these re-
ports were concealed in the files of lawyers for more than forty
years, shielded by claims of privilege. The title pages of the reports
lists the topic-for example, "Lung Cancer"-and the author and
date. There is no indication on the title pages that the reports were
sent to or prepared for legal counsel. A typical privilege log entry
for these reports, however, lists the legal department as the recipi-
ent of the reports and is a basic generic description which reveals
virtually nothing about the nature of the document:
Report prepared by an RJR scientist performing work at
the request of the legal department transmitted to RJR in-
house legal counsel for the purpose of providing confi-
372. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey, 118 S. Ct. 1384
(1998) (mem.).
373. See id. Simultaneous with production to Minnesota's counsel, the docu-
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dential information in order to assist in the rendering of
legal advice concerning a smoking and health issue.
The particular document described in this privilege log entry
was written in 1955. The actual title of this document, as revealed
when the document was produced forty-three years later, is: "Lung
Cancer - Smoking Studies.
3
1
The actual titles of other, withheld reports in the Rodgman se-
ries, also written in the 1950s, include:




* Arsenic and/or Arsenic Compounds - Carcinogenesis
Studies 77
" Tobacco-Arsenic Studies7 s
* Lip Cancer - Smoking Studies37 9
By today's standards, and by today's state of scientific knowl-
edge on the health hazards of smoking, these Rodgman reports
seem to be fairly innocuous descriptions of scientific evidence on
smoking and health. But it is important to keep in mind that these
reports were written years before the surgeon general declared, in
his seminal 1964 report, that smoking caused lung cancer in men.
At the time these reports were written, there was an active debate-
fueled in large part by the tobacco industry-regarding the health
hazards of smoking. If these reports had been disclosed by RJR at
the time they were written, the consequences-for the tobacco
companies and for the public health-would have been dramatic.
The documents withheld on claims of privilege provide insight
not only into the routing of scientific information through lawyers,
but also into lawyers' direction and control of the scientific re-
search itself. One colorful illustration of the dominance of tobacco
company lawyers was revealed in a document which described the
374. RJR 502815280 (privilege log).
375. Id. All privileged documents discussed in this section of article will be
referenced by Bates Number. Presently, these documents are not available to the
public at the Minnesota Depository. They can, however, be located on a congres-
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following encounter with Willard Bright, a former top scientist at
RJR: "[0] nce when Bright was introduced to someone as the "sen-
ior scientist at RJRT," Bright interrupted and said, "No, Ramm
is."38 0 "Ramm" is Henry Ramm, former general counsel at RJR.
The documents provide details concerning RJR's efforts to
conceal unfavorable scientific research. The excerpts below are
from a "fact memorandum" 8" prepared by RJR's outside counsel,
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, that describes RJR's research and de-
velopment activities:
9 In some cases, the control exerted by the Law De-
partment or R&D Management went beyond "word-
smithing" to efforts to prevent the distribution or produc-
tion of certain reports. The following examples, which
may be of some interest to Company critics, reflect these
efforts:
(i) 1953 Teague literature survey. In approximately
1953, Dr. Claude Teague reviewed the smoking and
health literature and was surprised by the volume of
material which 'indicted' cigarette smoking .... Ac-
cording to Dr. Teague, the Law Department advised
that this report should not be circulated. Although
copies of this report still exist, he believes that Henry
Ramm advised that the report be collected and de-
stroyed. 38
(iii) Nitrosamine research (1965-67). Jim Fredrickson,
383who was working on identifying nitrosamines in
smoke in approximately 1965-67, was told.., not to
prepare a final report on his research but merely to
record the work in his laboratory notebooks. 84
* Through the years, there apparently has been a gen-
eral informal policy at RJRT against publication of any-
thing that bears on the smoking and health issue. For ex-
380. RJR 515873872, n.81.
381. RJR 515873805.
382. RJR 515873896-97.
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ample, Dr. Laurene said that even though RJRT published
frequently, nothing was published on the smoking and
health issue while he was with the Company. According to
Laurene, this practice reflected the view of top manage-
ment.
The documents also provide evidence of the extensive control
of research into nicotine by lawyers for Philip Morris. One docu-
ment withheld as privileged, written in 1980, highlights the long-
standing tension between the Philip Morris scientists and the law-
yers on what research could be conducted on nicotine and on
smoking-caused disease. The document was written by William L.
Dunn, a Philip Morris scientist also known as "the Nicotine Kid."
The document is titled, "The Nicotine Receptor Program." The
document states:
The psychopharmacology of nicotine is a highly vexatious
topic. It is where the action is for those doing fundamen-
tal research on smoking, and from where most likely will
come significant scientific developments profoundly in-
fluencing the industry. Yet it is where our attorneys least want
us to be, for two reasons .... The first reason is the oldest
and is implicit in the legal strategy employed over the
years in defending corporations within the industry from
the claims of heirs and estates of deceased smokers: "We
within the industry are ignorant of any relationship be-
tween smoking and disease. Within our laboratories no
work is being conducted on biological systems." That pos-
ture has moderated considerably as our attorneys have
come to acknowledge that the original carte blanche
avoidance of all biological research is not required in or-
der to plead ignorance about a3n pathological relation-
ship between smoke and 
smoker.
Dunn further described the second reason why the Philip
Morris attorneys were concerned about research on the pharma-
cological activity of nicotine:
This is a more recent concern arising from increasingly
385. RJR 515873908.
386. PM 1000127789 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 25
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favorable prospects for the success of a legislative effort to
transfer authority for the regulation of tobacco manufac-
ture to a Federal agency (F.D.A.) known to have interests
and powers antithetical to the interests of the industry.
Any action on our part, such as research on the psycho-
pharmacology of nicotine, which implicitly or explicitly
treats nicotine as a drug could well be viewed as a tacit ac-
knowledgement that nicotine is a drug. Such an acknow-
ledgement, contend our attorneys, would be untimely. There-
fore, although permitted to continue the development of
a three-pronged program to study the drug nicotine, we
must not be visible about it.Y
Dunn concluded by stressing the commercial necessity of re-
search into nicotine; he believed, after all, "that specific action of
nicotine ... causes the smoker to repeatedly introduce nicotine
into his body."388 The concern of the attorneys, however, had to be
accommodated. Thus, Dunn wrote: "Our attorneys... will likely
continue to insist upon a clandestine effort in order to keep nico-
tine the drug in low profile."389
By 1984, however, as the nicotine research progressed at Philip
Morris, the attorneys grew increasingly concerned. One internal
document, authored by the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, de-
scribes the shutdown of the Philip Morris Nicotine Program in
1984. The scientist mentioned in the following excerpt is Dr. Vic-
torJ. DeNoble, who researched nicotine and nicotine analogues at
Philip Morris. The document states:
In July 1984, Patrick Sirridge of Shook, Hardy & Bacon
wrote to Philip Morris' Assistant General Counsel Fredric
Newman transmitting an analysis of DeNoble's published
literature, unpublished manuscripts, and in-press manu-
scripts .... The analysis concluded that "[r]esearch en-
gaged in, as well as some possibly under consideration, by
Philip Morris has undesirable and dangerous implications
for litigation positions the industry takes in regard to
smoking behavior .... In the final analysis, the perform-
ing and publishing of nicotine related research seems ill-
advised from a litigation point of view ......
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In the spring 1984, DeNoble was terminated and the
Nicotine Program was discontinued. Although there were
no internal documents found stating the reasons why De-
Noble and his program were terminated, it could be easily
concluded that the unfavorable analysis of the program submitted
by Philip Morris' legal counsel prompted DeNoble's termination
and the program's cancellation.g9
This document notwithstanding, it is doubtful that Philip Mor-
ris eliminated all nicotine research from 1984 onwards. The prop-
erties of nicotine-the addictiveness of nicotine-are the founda-
tion of the cigarette market. Thus, there is evidence of continuing
nicotine research conducted by Philip Morris-including, most
significantly, at INBIFO, the Philip Morris research facility in Ger-391
many. Another document withheld on claims of privilege but
eventually produced to plaintiffs notes that the "largest research
area" at INBIFO was "PM USA product research. As with docu-
ments produced earlier in the litigation, this document notes the
benefits of offshore research. The document states:
According to Tony, final reports on PM USA product
research are sent to Richmond for a review and are then
returned to INBIFO. Supporting data and documents are kept at
INBIFO.
Tony said that most documentation is maintained on comput-
ers and much of it is written in German.sgs
A number of the withheld documents relate to CTR-and to-
bacco industry lawyers' control over the scientific research of this
supposedly independent organization. One document, for exam-
ple, describes in detail the routing of "dangerous" research propos-
als through the law firm of Jacob, Medinger & Finnegan, longtime
counsel to the tobacco industry. The document describes the pro-
cedure used during the period when William Hoyt was CTR presi-
dent, as follows: "During William Hoyt's presidency, cases were not
automatically assigned a number. All potential cases ... which
390. PM 2021423422 (emphasis added).
391. See, e.g., PM 2025988909; PM 2025988395.
392. See PM 2043725390.
393. PM 2043725390-91 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 25
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were considered 'dangerous' were sent to Jacob, Medinger & Fin-
negan for a 'legal' opinion." 94
Thus, certain proposals for research were sent first to lawyers,
before the research proposals could be evaluated for funding by
CTR's Scientific Advisory Board ("SAB"). After receiving the advice
of counsel, many of the research proposals were apparently
"treated as a case" and forwarded to the SAB. 395 Other proposals,
however, "were apparently held indefinitely, not treated as a case,
or a letter discouraging formal application was sent."396 Research
proposals which were "of greatest concern" 97 included:
* Inhalation studies... [with] Syrian hamsters.
* Investigation of the effects of prenatal nicotine expo-
sure.., in the rat.
* [Study of] ... the effects of maternal smoking on the
human reproductive process, taking special account of the
differences between brand and composition of the ciga-
rettes that are smoked.
* Study of nicotine and the central nervous system.
* Study of factors associated with human bone loss. Pre-
liminary data suggested a relationship between certain
3981smoking habits, bone loss and age.
Other documents withheld on claims of privilege provide addi-
tional examples of the manipulation of CTR research. One docu-
ment ultimately produced to plaintiffs is an annotated summary of
numerous documents relating to CTR, and includes some of the
following examples of what the "anticipated plaintiff position"
might beY
9
* We [the tobacco industry] have deliberately isolated
the SAB from those areas of research which they might
consider were of a controversial or adversary nature and I
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maintained. 40 °
* CTR staff discussed, "the possible merit of having the
three of us [Little, Hockett & Hoyt] screen all new appli-
cations before circulating them." The screening process al-
lowed them to weed out potentially harmful grant applica-
tions.
* Beginning in 1958 CTR staff heavily solicited grantees.
This focus was on getting the "right" kind of grantee-i.e.,
someone whose research would not harm the industry's
position regarding smoking and health.
* As a result of this selection process, CTR reported
that, in 1969 only 12% of the unsolicited grants were
funded."
* In 1969 CTR established a Planning Committee. This
committee wrote and designed CTR projects and told in-
vestigators what to do. Grantees were to be "given specific
assignments that are part of the overall attack on the
problem." CTR grantees were no longer free to conduct
their research. Instead their projects were so rigidly con-
trolled by CTR there was no possibility that adverse smok-
ing and health results could come to light.
At the 1970 Annual Meeting Dr. Little admitted that it
did not matter whether it was a grant or contract because
"C.T.R. wrote, designed, did everything 'but diaper the
animals. -402
* [R] emember that the cigarette companies in the U.S.
have given the prime responsibility in the health area to
their lawyers.
Finally, the withheld documents also provide evidence of dis-
cussions of the potential for extensive and systematic destruction or
alteration of documents. One document produced by BAT de-
scribes a high-level meeting held in 1986 to discuss the collection of
internal documents in a "document review" and "discovery exer-
cise" to prepare for "BATCO being involved in direct or indirect
400. B&W 682632038.
401. B&W 682632076.
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legal action in the smoking and health arena.",404 British counsel in-
tended to meet with U.S. lawyers-from Shook, Hardy & Bacon-to
learn how similar document reviews had been conducted in the
United States.40 5 There also was a "discussion about the destruction
406of documents" at the BAT research center. The document states:
[N.B. Cannar of the BAT legal department] said that Mr.
[Patrick] Sheehy [chairman of British-American Tobacco
and BAT Industries] did not wish it to be seen that
BATCO had instituted a destruction policy only when the
possibility of their being involved in litigation became real
and after they had instructed solicitors. Thus, it was de-
cided that no destruction policy should be adopted,
rather that R&DC [Research & Development Centre] would
tidy up the loose papers held by individuals, which "spring clean"
could involve the destruction of documents such as previous
drafts ....
It was agreed that such a "spring clean" of all of the
loose papers held outside the official filing systems is es-
sential to enable L.W.&K.'s "task force" to carry out stages. .. . 407
I and III (the listing and reviewing of the files).
Similarly, documents from RJR describe systematic efforts to
cleanse its files--or "invalidate"-documents. One document is ti-
tled "Invalidation of Some Reports in the Research Department,"
and states:
We do not foresee any difficulty in the event a decision is
reached to remove certain reports from Research files.
Once it becomes clear that such action is necessary for the
successful defense of our present and future suits, we will
promptly remove all such reports from our files.
As to the reports which you are recommending be in-
validated, we can cite misinterpretation of data as reason
for invalidation. A further reason is that many of these
404. BAT 107443680.
405. See BAT 107443681.
406. BAT 107443682.
407. Id. (emphasis added).
1999]
89
Ciresi et al.: Decades of eceit: ocument iscovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Li
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
are needless repetitions and are being removed to allevi-
ate overcrowding of our files.
As an alternative to invalidation, we can have the
authors rewrite those sections of the reports which appear• . 408
objectionable.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DOCUMENT DISCOVERY IN
STATE OF MINNESOTA V. PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED
The lessons learned in the Minnesota discovery battle should
prove valuable in the ongoing efforts to control and regulate this
deadly industry. The documents disclosed in the last few years-
the words of the industry itself-are the best proof of its fraud
regarding: (1) what the industry knew-that smoking causes
cancer; (2) when the industry knew it-in the 1950s; and (3) what
the industry did about it-systematic denial and cover-up.
These documents are now available, in the Minnesota deposi-
tory and on the Internet, for future trials in the United States and
abroad, and for future tobacco control efforts through regulation
and legislation. Hopefully, these documents can help guide future
policy debate and legislative action.4°9
These documents-and the decades-long history of the to-
bacco litigation-also should aid professionals from multiple disci-
plines to conduct a careful review and analysis of how a renegade
industry was able to escape accountability under our system of ju-
risprudence-with such disastrous consequences for the public
health.
408. RJR 500284499.
409. See Hurt & Robertson, supra note 94, at 1180 (arguing that documents
uncovered in Minnesota litigation should preclude any liability limitations for in-
dustry); Koop, supra note 2, at 550 (arguing in early 1998 against any concessions
to industry as "recent and growing disclosure of past tobacco industry misconduct
and mendacity" now allows "[p]olicies once thought undoable").
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